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Leakage from Montgomery Multiplication

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Cryptographic Engineering

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Strictly speaking, \(M\) must be square-free to avoid the possibility of output \(S=M\), which is forbidden in the post-condition of the code. The output bound is treated later in this section.

  2. 2.

    See Exercise 2 for the non-square-free case.

  3. 3.

    In the next section we find that the probability of a subtraction is at most \(\frac{1}{2}\) and, by increasing \(R\), the probability can be made as close to 0 as desired.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Comodo CA Ltd, America

    Colin D. Walter

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  1. Colin D. Walter
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Correspondence to Colin D. Walter .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. City University of Istanbul, Tophane, Istanbul, Turkey

    Çetin Kaya Koç

  2. University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, USA

    Çetin Kaya Koç

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Walter, C.D. (2009). Leakage from Montgomery Multiplication. In: Koç, Ç.K. (eds) Cryptographic Engineering. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-71817-0_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-71817-0_16

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