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Improved Techniques for Side-Channel Analysis

  • Pankaj Rohatgi

Introduction

Over the last several years, side-channel analysis has emerged as a major threat to securing sensitive information in hardware and systems. The list of side-channels that have been (re)discovered include timing [8] micro-architectural anomalies [5, 13, 12, 1], power consumption [9], electromagnetic emanations [14,7,2], optical [10,11] and acoustic leakage [4]. These side-channels have been used to break implementations of all major cryptographic algorithms (such as DES, AES, RSA, Diffie-Hellman, Elliptic curves, COMP128, etc.) both in software and in hardware as well as for extracting information directly from peripherals. Concurrently a variety of side-channel analysis techniques have been developed to perform these attacks. These techniques include simple power/EM analysis (SPA/SEMA), differential power/EM analysis (DPA/DEMA), higher-order DPA/DEMA, inferential power analysis (IPA), partitioning attacks, collision attacks, hidden Markov model, etc.

In fact, side-channel...

Keywords

Smart Card Clock Cycle Stream Cipher Elementary Operation Target Device 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.IBM T. J. Watson Research CenterAmerica

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