Basics of Side-Channel Analysis

  • Marc Joye


Classical cryptography considers attack scenarios of adversaries getting black box access to a cryptosystem, namely to its inputs and outputs. For example, in a chosen ciphertext attack, an adversary can submit ciphertexts of her choice to a decryption oracle and receives in return the corresponding plaintexts. In real life, however, an adversary may be more powerful. For example, an adversary may in addition monitor the execution of the cryptosystem under attack and collect some side-channel information, such as the execution time or the power consumption. The idea behind side-channel analysis is to infer some secret data from this extra information.

This chapter presents several applications of side-channel analysis using different types of side-channel leakage. The primary goal is to explain the basic principles of side-channel analysis through concrete examples. Simple countermeasures to prevent side-channel leakage are also discussed. More sophisticated methods and...


Smart Card Encryption Algorithm Advance Encryption Standard Differential Power Analysis Power Trace 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Thomson R&D FranceAmerica

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