Game Theoretic Applications to Fisheries

  • Veijo Kaitala
  • Marko Lindroos
Part of the International Series In Operations Research amp; Mana book series (ISOR, volume 99)

This chapter reviews non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretic models applied to the economics and management of multi-agent fisheries. We first compare two-player static and dynamic non-cooperative games, and then multiplayer non-cooperative and cooperative coalition games. In both comparisons we will make use of same type of models in order to facilitate the comparison of analyses and conclusions.


Nash Equilibrium Grand Coalition Static Game Coalition Game International Fishery 
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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Veijo Kaitala
  • Marko Lindroos

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