This chapter reviews non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretic models applied to the economics and management of multi-agent fisheries. We first compare two-player static and dynamic non-cooperative games, and then multiplayer non-cooperative and cooperative coalition games. In both comparisons we will make use of same type of models in order to facilitate the comparison of analyses and conclusions.
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Kaitala, V., Lindroos, M. (2007). Game Theoretic Applications to Fisheries. In: Weintraub, A., Romero, C., Bjørndal, T., Epstein, R., Miranda, J. (eds) Handbook Of Operations Research In Natural Resources. International Series In Operations Research amp; Mana, vol 99. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-71815-6_11
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