One of the most significant fishery resource management problems to have arisen under the New Law of the Sea consists of the management of internationally shared fish stocks. A game theoretic analysis is given of the management of the two key classes of such stocks, those shared between and among neighbouring coastal states – transboundary stocks – and those crossing the boundary of the coastal state exclusive economic zone into the adjacent high seas – highly migratory and straddling stocks. The management of highly migratory and straddling stocks raises particularly difficult management issues, several of which remain unresolved. The analysis is accompanied by two case studies: Norwegian spring-spawning herring, a straddling stock and Northeast Atlantic bluefin tuna, a highly migratory stock.
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Bjørndal, T., Munro, G. (2007). Shared Fish Stocks and High Seas Issues. In: Weintraub, A., Romero, C., Bjørndal, T., Epstein, R., Miranda, J. (eds) Handbook Of Operations Research In Natural Resources. International Series In Operations Research amp; Mana, vol 99. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-71815-6_10
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