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Shared Fish Stocks and High Seas Issues

  • Trond Bjørndal
  • Gordon Munro
Part of the International Series In Operations Research amp; Mana book series (ISOR, volume 99)

One of the most significant fishery resource management problems to have arisen under the New Law of the Sea consists of the management of internationally shared fish stocks. A game theoretic analysis is given of the management of the two key classes of such stocks, those shared between and among neighbouring coastal states – transboundary stocks – and those crossing the boundary of the coastal state exclusive economic zone into the adjacent high seas – highly migratory and straddling stocks. The management of highly migratory and straddling stocks raises particularly difficult management issues, several of which remain unresolved. The analysis is accompanied by two case studies: Norwegian spring-spawning herring, a straddling stock and Northeast Atlantic bluefin tuna, a highly migratory stock.

Keywords

Fish Stock Coastal State Bluefin Tuna Faroe Island Purse Seine 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Trond Bjørndal
    • 1
  • Gordon Munro
    • 1
  1. 1.CEMAREUniversity of PortsmouthUK

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