Financial contributions to political parties and candidates are an important source of political influence in many societies. This is, perhaps, nowhere more true than in the United States, where candidates' need to raise and spend vast sums of money is accentuated by a system of weak and decentralized parties, single-member-district elections, nomination by party primaries, limited public funding, and media intensive campaigns that emphasize image and personality over clear policy differences. Given the vast inequalities in wealth in the U.S., rich contributors — including wealthy capitalists and giant corporations — play a dominant role in campaign finance and, thereby, exercise disproportionate influence over politics and public policy (Clawson et al. 1998; Domhoff 2006; Mills 1956).
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Burris, V. (2010). Corporations, Capitalists, and Campaign Finance. In: Leicht, K.T., Jenkins, J.C. (eds) Handbook of Politics. Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-68930-2_14
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