Verification and Arms Control Treaties

  • David Hafemeister


The two leaders just signed the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and were in the process of agreeing on aspects of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The signing marked the beginning of the end of the cold war, 2 years before the November 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and 3 years before the agreement on the Conventional Arms in Europe Treaty.


Nuclear Weapon Nuclear Explosion Nuclear Test Adaptive Optic Ballistic Missile 
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Copyright information

© Springer 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Hafemeister
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhysicsCalifornia Polytechnic State UniversitySan Luis ObispoUSA

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