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Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data

Abstract

The theoretical results on power and equity in the previous chapter describe attributes of voting systems but give little insight into their performance in practice. Similarly, the earlier findings on sincerity, strategy-proofness, and Condorcet candidates facilitate theoretical comparisons among different systems but do not demonstrate whether, in a particular election, a Condorcet candidate was or could have been elected if voting was sincere.

Keywords

Vote System Preference Order Approval Vote Election Data Admissible Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Footnotes to Chapter 6

  1. 1.
    The subsequent results in this section and the first part of Section 6.4 are based on Peter C. Fishburn, “Deducing Majority Candidates from Election Data,” Social Science Research 9,3 (September 1980), 216–224. Proofs of Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 are given in this article.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    The analysis in this section and Section 6.6 is based on Peter C. Fishburn and Steven J. Brams, “Deducing Simple Majorities from Approval Voting Ballot Data,” Social Science Research 10,3 (September 1981), 256–266. Proofs of Theorem 6.3 and 6.4 are given in this article.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960).Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Steven J. Brams and George Sharrard, “Analysis of Pilot Study Questions on Preference Rankings and Approval Voting” (mimeographed, 1979).Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    P. C. Fishburn and S. J. Brams, “Deducing Simple Majorities from Approval Voting Ballot Data.”Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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