Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data
The theoretical results on power and equity in the previous chapter describe attributes of voting systems but give little insight into their performance in practice. Similarly, the earlier findings on sincerity, strategy-proofness, and Condorcet candidates facilitate theoretical comparisons among different systems but do not demonstrate whether, in a particular election, a Condorcet candidate was or could have been elected if voting was sincere.
KeywordsVote System Preference Order Approval Vote Election Data Admissible Strategy
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Footnotes to Chapter 6
- 3.Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960).Google Scholar
- 4.Steven J. Brams and George Sharrard, “Analysis of Pilot Study Questions on Preference Rankings and Approval Voting” (mimeographed, 1979).Google Scholar
- 5.P. C. Fishburn and S. J. Brams, “Deducing Simple Majorities from Approval Voting Ballot Data.”Google Scholar