Cryptanalysis of a voting scheme

  • Markus Michels
  • Patrick Horster
Part of the IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology book series (IFIPAICT)


At Eurocrypt’93 Park, Itoh and Kurusawa presented a voting scheme based on an efficient concrete mix-net. However, Pfitzmann pointed out that the used concrete mix-net is vulnerable to active and passive attacks. Therefore, the anonymity of the votes can’t be guaranteed. Furthermore, Pfitzmann discussed some countermeasures against the attacks and how far they help.

In this paper we point out that independent of the used mix-net the voting scheme suffers from even more weaknesses. More precisely, we show that neither robustness nor fairness can be gained, although the main purpose of this voting scheme was to guarantee fairness.


cryptology cryptanalysis voting schemes anonymous channels mix-nets 


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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Markus Michels
    • 1
  • Patrick Horster
    • 1
  1. 1.Theoretical Computer Science and Information SecurityUniversity of Technology Chemnitz-ZwickauChemnitzGermany

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