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Corporate Corruption in the New Economy

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Abstract

In popular usage the “New Economy” refers to developments in the late 1990s such as the rise of the Internet, a boom in tech stocks, an explosion of dot-com start-ups, and the appearance of new business doctrines and cultures. Countless revelations that surfaced after the boom came to an illegal end, suggesting that epic fraud was as much a part of the New Economy as the dot-coms had been. The epidemic of crime among the ranks of prestigious corporations and professionals puzzled observers across the intellectual spectrum. Federal Reserve Chairman Allan Greenspan, fonnerly an exuberant fan of the New Economy, rued its “infectious greed”. Law professor Frank Partnoy asked whether, in the wake of regulatory and cultural shifts, it was possible to convict business actors of financial crimes.1 Sociologist Paul Hirsch remarked that the participants in the frauds had occupied central positions but apparently “rejected” the “legal culture” of the mainstream.2 Robert Tillman and Michael Indergaard asked, “How was it that such a broad spectrum of Corporate America ended up a field of schemes?3

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Tillman, R., Indergaard, M. (2007). Corporate Corruption in the New Economy. In: Pontell, H.N., Geis, G. (eds) International Handbook of White-Collar and Corporate Crime. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34111-8_23

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