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Consciousness

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  1. James also states that the word stands not for an entity but for a function (Wilshire, 1984, p. 163). In the second chapter of Principles of Psychology he asks: “But is the consciousness which accompanies the activity of the cortex the only consciousness that man has? Or are his lower centers conscious as well?”

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  2. At the level of the nerve membrane, consciousness can be altered by chemicals that bind to membrane proteins and block ionic transport across the membrane. At the level of the neuron, consciousness is routinely switched off and on by anesthetic agents that change the action of the synaptic contacts between cells. At higher levels, one is conscious of something called thought, which is stored in myriad complex assemblies that have been pieced together throughout the years of learning. Thought, in turn, is formed by and interacts with the culture in which it develops. Up and down the hierarchy, from membrane ion channels to the ebb and flow of cultural interactions, an intense intercourse between the levels continues (Scott, 1995, p. 172).

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  3. As I mentioned previously in discussing this point in Edelman’s model, I have come to the conclusion that the “mental” translation has an interactive function. In a previous book (Sanguineti, 1999, pp. 35–34) I exposed in detail—although from an essentially psychological, first-person perspective—my inferences about these two different types of thought organization, which I labeled “very rapid thinking” (VRT) and “relational thinking” (RT).

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  4. At the cost of being redundant I want to stress again that from the psychological perspective equating, and therefore limiting, mind to (Cartesian) higher-order consciousness (Edelman & Tononi, 2000, p. 190) is in my opinion another serious categorical error.

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© 2007 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

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(2007). Consciousness. In: The Rosetta Stone of the Human Mind. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-33645-9_5

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