From Old Threats to Enigmatic Enemies: The Evolution of European Policies from Low Intensity Violence to Homegrown Terrorism

Abstract

Different patterns of violence have recently disrupted European cities. In France, 8,700 vehicles were burnt, 255 schools, 233 public buildings and 51 post offices damaged and 140 public-transport vehicles stoned during three weeks of disturbances which took place in three hundred neighborhoods of several cities in November 2005. Although hundreds of editorials were written or pronounced after these events (with a lot of sympathy for the rioters expressed by the jet set), what occurred gave an impression of “deja vu,” as if urban threats from marginalized places and residents had to periodically resurface at the core of society¹. After two youths were accidentally electrocuted while purportedly fleeing the police in Clichy-sous-Bois, a problem area in the Parisian region, a minority of male youths revolted emotionally and torched cars to make a statement of distress and anger. Torching cars is not unusual; it is one resource in the limited repertoire these youths have (every day in France, 140 cars are burnt on average, according to the police unions). Youths resort to their cell phones, either to communicate with other youths and perhaps challenge them to take action or to watch the news and check whether by chance their specific deeds have been covered. Reporters remarked that they were left alone as soon as the news started on the major television channels, as the youngsters gathered around their cell phones to watch them. I observed a similar competition in Strasbourg where cars are traditionally burnt on New Year’s Eve.

Three months after the disorders, 86% of the French and 89% of the 30–49 year olds expected more disorders; 82% of the French and 90% of the cohort under 30 years of age did not believe that solutions had been brought for the problems (CSA-Le Parisien opinion poll, January 25–26, 2006).