A Philosopher’s View on Bayesian Evaluation of Informative Hypotheses

  • Jan-Willem RomeijnEmail author
  • Rens van de Schoot
Part of the Statistics for Social and Behavioral Sciences book series (SSBS)


This chapter provides an answer to the question: What it is, philosophically speaking, to choose a model in a statistical procedure, and what does this amounts to in the context of a Bayesian inference? Special attention is given to Bayesian model selection, specifically the choice between inequality constrained and unconstrained models based on their Bayes factors and posterior model probabilities.


Bayesian Inference Inductive Inference Bayesian Statistic Probability Assignment Logical Possibility 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Theoretical PhilosophyGroningen UniversityOude Boteringestraat 52the Netherlands
  2. 2.Department of Methodology and StatisticsUtrecht UniversityUtrechtthe Netherlands

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