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Elites and Transition

  • Graeme Gill

Abstract

The breakdown of an authoritarian regime does not always lead to a democratic outcome. It could, and historically in most cases has, led to the replacement of one authoritarian regime by another. However, particularly in the last quarter of the twentieth century, many cases of authoritarian breakdown have been part of a shift to democratic rule. The dynamics of this shift are more complicated than those involved in regime breakdown more narrowly considered because, as well as involving all of those forces which contributed to that breakdown, new elements will also usually play a part in structuring the change. This also means that there is more scope for transition to be derailed, and increases the level of potential uncertainty.

Keywords

Civil Society Regime Change Authoritarian Regime Transition Path Regime Type 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes and References

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© Graeme Gill 2000

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  • Graeme Gill

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