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Experimental Public Choice

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The Encyclopedia of Public Choice

Abstract

A few decades ago, most economists believed that their discipline was non-experimental. Economic phenomena should be studied theoretically or empirically. The ideal paper was one where rigorous theory was tested using advanced econometric methods. The fact that the empirics were usually based on (often incomplete) field data only remotely related to the problem at hand was no problem: this is why we had econometrics.

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Authors
  1. Arthur J. H. C. Schram
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. The Locke Institute, George Mason University, USA

    Charles K. Rowley

  2. Institute of Economic Policy, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria

    Friedrich Schneider

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© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Schram, A.J.H.C. (2004). Experimental Public Choice. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-8607-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-306-47828-4

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