Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

The Encyclopedia of Public Choice pp 77–90Cite as

Dictatorship

  • Chapter

Abstract

The literature which takes a public choice approach to dictatorship, largely barren before 1990 except for Tullock’s Autocracy (1987), is now growing and may be entering a period of prosperity. This survey focuses on the most recent literature, and on three questions in particular: (1) The behavior of dictators, including the the strategies dictators use to stay in power; (2) The relative efficiency of dictatorship: Which is better, dictatorship or democracy, in promoting economic growth and efficiency?; and (3) What policies should the democracies adopt to deal with dictatorships if they are interested in promoting freedom?

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   429.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   549.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   549.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Barro, Robert (1996a). “Democracy and growth.” Journal of Economic Growth, 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barro, Robert (1996b). Getting It Right. Boston: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary (1983). “Theory of competition among interest groups for political influence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98: 371–400.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (1998). “Sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy: a dynamic analysis.” American Economic Review, 88: 139–156.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (2001). “Ideocracy and totalitarianism: a formal analysis incorporating ideology.” Public Choice, 108(1–2): 33–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bilson, John (1982). “Civil liberties — an econometric investigation.” Kyklos, 35: 94–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coase, Ronald (1960). “The problem of social cost.” Journal of Law and Economics, 1–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • Congleton, Roger (2002). “From dictatorship to democracy without revolution,” paper delivered at the American Economic Association meetings, Atlanta.

    Google Scholar 

  • Downs, Anthony (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Epp, Charles (1998). The Rights Revolution. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freedom House (1978–2001). “Freedom in the world: the annual survey of political rights and civil liberties.” Freedom Review. New York: Freedom House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedrich, Karl and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1965). Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Howitt, Peter and Ronald Wintrobe (1995). “The political economy of inaction.” Journal of Public Economics, 56: 329–353.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ignatieff, Michael (2000). The Rights Revolution. Toronto: Anansi Press for the CBC.

    Google Scholar 

  • Islam, Muhammed and Stanley L. Winer (2001). “Tinpots, totalitarians (and democrats): an empirical investigation of the effects of economic growth on civil liberties and political rights,” ms., Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaempfer, W., Anton Lowenberg, and William Mertens (2001). “International economic sanctions against a dictator,” paper delivered at the Public Choice Society Meetings, San Antonio, Texas.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keefer, Philip, Christopher Clague, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson (1996). “Property and contract rights under democracy and dictatorship.” The Journal of Economic Growth, 1(2): 243–276.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Londregan, John and Keith T. Poole (1996). “Does high income produce democracy”? World Politics, 49: 1–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McFaul, Michael (1995). “State power, institutional change, and the politics of privatization in Russia.” World Politics, 47: 210–243.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moselle, Boaz and Benjamin Polak (2001). “A model of a predatory state.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 17: 1–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • North, Douglas (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W.W. Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, Douglas and Barry Weingast (1989). “Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century England.” Journal of Economic History, XLIX: 808–832.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, Mancur (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, Mancur (1993). “Democracy and development.” American Political Science Review, 87: 567–575.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Olson, Mancur (2000). Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictators. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peltzman, Samuel (1976). “Towards a more general theory of regulation.” Journal of Law and Economics, 19: 211–240.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Posner, R.A. (1975). “The social costs of monopoly and regulation.” Journal of Political Economy, 83: 807–827.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi (2000). Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950–1990. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Robinson, James (1997). “When is a state predatory,” ms., USC.

    Google Scholar 

  • Root, Hilton (1994). The Foundation of Privilege: Political Foundations of Markets in Old Regime France and England. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schumpeter, Joseph (1943, 1976). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: George Allen and Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, Amartya (1993). “Political Rights and Economic Needs,” The John M. Olin Lecture in Law and Economics at the University of Toronto Law School, October 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spagat, Michael (2001). “Political instability and growth in dictatorships,” ms., Royal Holloway College, England.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, G. J. (1971). “The Theory of Economic Regulation” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 137–146.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijihoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Verwimp, Philip (2001). “The political economy of coffee and dictatorship in Rwanda,” ms., Department of Economics, Leuven, Belgium.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wintrobe, Ronald (1990). “The tinpot and the totalitarian: an economic theory of dictatorship.” American Political Science Review, 84: 849–872.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wintrobe, Ronald (1998). The Political Economy of Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wintrobe, Ronald (1998b). “Some lessons on the efficiency of democracy from a study of dictatorship,” in S. Borner and M. Paldam (eds.) The Political Dimension of Economic Growth. McMillan: International Economic Association.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wintrobe, Ronald (2002). “The contest for power: property rights, human rights, and economic efficiency,” paper presented at the American Economic Association meetings, Atlanta.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittman, Donald (1983). “Parties as utility maximizers.” American Political Science Review, 77, 142–157.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wittman, Donald (1995). The Myth of Democratic Failure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhisui, Li (1994). The Private Life of Chairman Mao. New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Ronald Wintrobe
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. The Locke Institute, George Mason University, USA

    Charles K. Rowley

  2. Institute of Economic Policy, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria

    Friedrich Schneider

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Wintrobe, R. (2004). Dictatorship. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-8607-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-306-47828-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation