Abstract
Total expenditures by the United States federal government in 2001 were $1.8 trillion, or 18 percent of GDP. Candidates for congressional office spent $1.01 billion in the 2000 election cycle; for presidential office the sum was $354 million. On top of this, national parties spent an additional $495 million in soft money. Both candidate spending and soft money have risen sharply in recent years: in comparison to the 2000 figures, congressional spending and soft money averaged $730 million and $169 million respectively over the previous four election cycles (FEC, 2001; CRP, 2002). Most political commentators and politicians have decried these sums and trends as too high. Consider, however, that private sector advertising was $240 billion in 2000 (Census, 2001), which was 3.2 percent of the private sector share of GDP. In contrast, advertising in the 2000 national elections was 0.001 percent of the federal government’s share of GDP. The latter figure would be even lower if I included the non-budget roles of the federal government (such as tax expenditures, loans and loan guarantees, mandates, and regulations). This comparison should provide some perspective in demonstrating the relatively small amount of money devoted to campaign finance.
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López, E.J. (2004). Campaign Finance 1. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_47
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_47
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