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Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance

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The Encyclopedia of Public Choice

Abstract

As a great deal of work has been done in the area of campaign finance, I have chosen to focus on four areas in this essay. They are 1) the effect of contributions on congressional votes, 2) inferences from contribution patterns about the structure of the U.S. Congress or about the strategies of players, 3) the effects of campaign spending on electoral outcomes, and 4) the effects of campaign finance laws on electoral outcomes.

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Authors
  1. Thomas Stratmann
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. The Locke Institute, George Mason University, USA

    Charles K. Rowley

  2. Institute of Economic Policy, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria

    Friedrich Schneider

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© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Stratmann, T. (2004). Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_46

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_46

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-8607-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-306-47828-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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