Abstract
Altruism is something of a puzzle to economists. While in theory the elements of the utility function are left unspecified, it is generally assumed that private goods consumed by the individual himself are the most important components. If not, then it becomes difficult to make falsifiable predictions and so scientific advance becomes impeded. Nonetheless, we observe that people do have altruistic elements in their behavior, and so the problem is to explain these elements and incorporate them in utility functions in ways that preserve testability. In this entry, I will mainly analyze altruistic acts towards non-relatives, with a brief discussion of altruism towards kin.
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Rubin, P.H. (2004). Altruism. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_32
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_32
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