Abstract
Assume that every voter’s preferences are single-peaked and slope downward monotonically on either side of the peak (unless his peak lies at one extreme of the scale).... The best way [for each party] to gain more support is to move toward the other extreme, so as to get more voters outside of it — i.e., to come between them and its opponent. As the two parties move closer together, they become more moderate and less extreme in policy in an effort to win the crucial middle-of-the-road voters, i.e., those whose views place them between the two parties. This center area becomes smaller and smaller as both parties strive to capture moderate votes; finally the two parties become nearly identical in platforms and actions. (Downs, 1957, pp. 116–117)
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Hinich, M.J., Munger, M.C. (2004). Spatial Theory. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_26
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_26
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