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The Encyclopedia of Public Choice pp 263–283Cite as

Regulation and Antitrust

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Abstract

The state — the machinery and power of the state — is a potential resource or threat to every industry in the society. With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give money, the state can and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of industries. (Stigler, 1971: 3)

I benefited from the comments and suggestions of Fred McChesney, Michael Reksulak, Charles Rowley, Russell Sobel, Alexander Tabarrok and Robert Tollison. As is customary, however, I accept full responsibility for any remaining errors.

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  1. William F. Shughart II
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  1. The Locke Institute, George Mason University, USA

    Charles K. Rowley

  2. Institute of Economic Policy, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria

    Friedrich Schneider

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Shughart, W.F. (2004). Regulation and Antitrust. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_22

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