Abstract
As Mussolini had realised, the first price to pay for leaving the Axis was his own fall from power. The second — German occupation of Italy and her territory — was completed speedily in September 1943 on the news of the Italian armistice with the Allies and her official changing of sides. The leisurely maladroit way in which Badoglio’s royal government had opened its contacts with the Allies after July, and the king’s irresponsible flight to the Allied-occupied south effectively delivered the whole of Italy’s armed forces, men and equipment, to the invading Germans.
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Notes
Quoted in C. Levy, ‘Historians and the “First Republic” ’, in S. Berger, M. Donovan and K. Passmore (eds), Writing National Histories. Western Europe since 1800 (London: Routledge, 1999) p. 270.
From the text of the Verona Manifesto of November 1943 in R. De Felice (ed.), Autobiografia del Fascismo. Antologia di testifascisti 1919–1945 (Bergamo: Minerva Italica, 1978) p. 583.
See C. Pavone, La guerra civile. Saggio storico sulla moralità della Resistenza (Turin: Bollati Boringheri, 1991).
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© 2004 Philip Morgan
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Morgan, P. (2004). The Italian Social Republic, 1943–45. In: Italian Fascism, 1915–1945. The Making of the 20th Century. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-80267-4_9
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