Abstract
Foreign policy decisions were the most important and revealing of the regime’s nature and intentions, and must be harmonised with any view of domestic and economic policy between 1936 and 1940. The Ethiopian invasion could be regarded as a successful exercise in ‘determining weight’ diplomacy. Exploiting the threat of Germany to Anglo-French hegemony in Europe, Mussolini had won what he thought was a free run in East Africa in return for restraint on Germany in Europe, specifically resistance to Anschluss. The question is, what options were still open to Mussolini during and after Ethiopia? Could he maintain a position of ‘equidistance’ in international relations, and did he actually want to?
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Notes
From text in C.F. Delzell (ed.), Mediterranean Fascism (London: Macmillan, 1971) p. 201.
Quoted in RJ.B. Bosworth, Mussolini (London: Arnold, 2002) p. 291.
Quoted in A. Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale, vol. 3, La caduta dell’impero (Milan: Mondadori, 1992) p. 147.
Reported in M. Gallo, Mussolini’s Italy. Twenty Years of the Fascist Era (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1974) p. 281.
M. Donosti, Mussolini e l’Europa. La politica esterafascista (Rome: Leonardo, 1945) p. 166.
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© 2004 Philip Morgan
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Morgan, P. (2004). The Axis Connection and the ‘Fascistisation’ of Italian Society, 1936–40. In: Italian Fascism, 1915–1945. The Making of the 20th Century. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-80267-4_7
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