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The Effort to Enforce the Peace

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Book cover The Illusion of Peace

Part of the book series: The Making of the 20th Century ((MATWCE))

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Abstract

Although the Paris peace settlement dealt with the entire globe, it was a peculiarly European peace, written largely by the European victors to their own benefit. Despite nominal Japanese participation and Wilson’s efforts toward a new world order, the treaties reflected Europe’s view of the world and of its own role in it. Most of the assumptions upon which European leaders operated had, however, been rendered obsolete by the First World War. In this sense the settlement was anachronistic.

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Notes and References

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© 2003 Sally Marks

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Marks, S. (2003). The Effort to Enforce the Peace. In: The Illusion of Peace. The Making of the 20th Century. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-62949-3_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-62949-3_2

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-333-98589-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-230-62949-3

  • eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)

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