Skip to main content

China’s “New” Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, and Defense Strategy

  • Chapter
China’s “New” Diplomacy

Part of the book series: Palgrave Series in Asian Governance ((PSAG))

Abstract

In 1874 the Qing Imperial Court initiated a debate on the nation’s diplomatic and defense strategy. The central question was whether to prioritize on coastal defense in order to resist foreign naval invasion, Jiangfang, or on land-border defense to recover Xinjiang, Saifang.1 Although the coastal defense was not weakened, the Qing Court had raised the stake of land-border defense for a period of time in which the military received enough resources to recover Xinjiang. In realizing this adjustment of national defense priority, Beijing initiated intense diplomatic maneuvering: adopting a “passive foreign policy” toward oceanic powers to avoid confrontation, largely through making further concessions. In the meantime, tough diplomacy was taken against the penetration of continental powers along land borders. This was backed by military plans.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. Li Yuanpeng, “A Debate on Coastal Defense or Fort Defence in Strategic Focus in the Late Qing Dynasty,” China Military Science 2 (2002): 57.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Lieutenant General Wang Wenrong, The Guideline for the PLA’s Third Modernization (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army, 2005), 82.

    Google Scholar 

  3. For a detailed analysis, see You Ji, “Protecting Energy Transformation Security for the Rise of China,” Strategic Analysis 31, no. 3 (September 2007): 467–89.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. This is Deng’s famous twenty-eight-character instruction on foreign policy to Jiang Zemin. For an early analysis, see You Ji, “Coping with the Post–Cold War Foreign Policy Challenge,” in The Post–Cold War Collective Security in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Hun-mao-Tien, 233–73 (Taipei: National Policy Research Institute, 1995).

    Google Scholar 

  5. Wang Jisi, China’s Changing Role in Asia (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, January 2004), 1–17.

    Google Scholar 

  6. For a good analysis on the economics-security nexus, see Stuart Harris and Andrew Mark, eds., Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics-Politics Nexus (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997).

    Google Scholar 

  7. This is borrowed from Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  8. For a Chinese view, see Pan Zhongqi, “The Changing Image and China’s Engagement in the World Order,” World Economics and Politics 3 (2007): 48.

    Google Scholar 

  9. John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).

    Google Scholar 

  10. For an excellent paper on this point, see Alastair Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 5–56, http://www.mipressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/016228803321951081?cookieSet1amp;journaode=isec (accessed February 18, 2008);

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Steve Chen, “Realism, Revisionism and the Great Powers,” Issues and Studies 40, no. 1 (2004): 135–72.

    Google Scholar 

  12. James Thomson, “US Interests and the Fate of Alliances,” Survival 45, no. 4 (Winter 2003–4): 207–20 (214).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. You Ji, “China’s Anti-Secession Law and the Risk of War in the Taiwan Strait,” Contemporary Security Policy 27, no. 2 (August2006): 237–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Surveys show that many Taiwanese would prefer independence if there were no military threat from Beijing. Emerson Niou, “Understanding Taiwan Independence and its Policy Implication,” Asian Survey XLIV, no. 4 (2004): 555–67 (558).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. For the U.S. influence on global RMA transformation, see Emily Goldman and Leslie Elison, eds., The Diffusion of Military Technology and Idea (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

    Google Scholar 

  16. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, The PLA in the Cultural Revolution (Beijing: Zhongguo dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989).

    Google Scholar 

  17. Su Yu, “Several questions on strategy and tactics during the initial phase of a war against aggression,” Junshi xueshu [Military Art] 3 (1997): 1–15.

    Google Scholar 

  18. See also Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).

    Google Scholar 

  19. Qian Qichen, Ten Major Diplomatic Events that I Experienced (Beijing: Shijiezhishi chubanshe, 2003), chap. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  20. You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (New York: Allen & Unwin and I. B. Tauris, 1999).

    Google Scholar 

  21. Yu Shuguang, “The party committee must raise its ability to enhance military informatisation,” Journal of PLA National Defense University 12 (2003): 82.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Liao Wenzhong, “Systems integration and upgrading combat capabilities,” in Strategizing the Military Stance of the Taiwan Strait, ed. Chong-Pin Lin (Taipei: Student Publishing Bureau, 2002), 72.

    Google Scholar 

  23. See You Ji, “Learning and Catching Up: China’s RMA Initiative,” in The Information Revolution in Asia, eds. Emily Goldman and Tom Mahnken, 97–124 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

    Google Scholar 

  24. Jiang Zemin, “Facing the global RMA challenge,” in The Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2006). Yet, since 2006, the term “generation leap” seems to have been dropped from official vocabulary.

    Google Scholar 

  25. Ren Zhengguang, “Doing a good job in military preparation in the process of military transformation,” Journal of PLA National Defense University 12 (2003): 26.

    Google Scholar 

  26. General Qian Guoliang, “Comprehensively implement the guideline of headquarters construction,” Journal of the PLA National Defense University 6 (2000): 4.

    Google Scholar 

  27. Zhang Bolin, “The features of non-engagement warfare and countermeasures,” Military Art 9 (2002): 23. According to the PLA definition, nonengagement warfare represents different and new fighting principles, not just those of a change in time and space in combat. Long-range precision strikes and IW are key components of it.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Yang Jinshan, “The form of joint campaigns in the future warfare,” Journal of PLA National Defense University 1 (2004): 31.

    Google Scholar 

  29. You Ji, “China and North Korea: A Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience,” Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 28 (2001): 387–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  30. Hu Side et al., Nuclear Capabilities of the Region around China (Beijing: Yuanzhineng chubanshe, 2006), 37.

    Google Scholar 

  31. Deborah Cameron, “Tough sanctions will mean war, says North Korea,” Sydney Morning Herald, October 12, 2006, 9.

    Google Scholar 

  32. See You Ji, “Dealing with the ‘North Korea Dilemma’: China’s Response to Pyongyang’s Adventurism,” EAI Background Brief Paper, no. 323 (Singapore: East Asia Institute, Singapore National University, February 2007).

    Google Scholar 

  33. Nicolas Becquelin, “Xingjiang in the Nineties,” China Journal 44 (July 2000): 65–90. South Xinjiang is poorer than the rest of the province, and the Han Chinese make up about 10 percent of the local population.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. Lu Song, The New Order and Regional Security in Central Asia (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001), 173.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Reporter, “Combating rising terrorist threat against China,” Xinbao Zongheng Weekly (Beijing), November 16, 2001, 1–3.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Alan Lee Boyer, “U.S. Foreign Policy in Central Asia: Risk, Ends, and Means,” Naval War College Review 59, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 91–118, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/documents/NWCRW06.pdf (accessed March 7, 2008).

    Google Scholar 

  37. For China’s Central Asia diplomacy, see Yang Shu, China and Central Asia in Transition (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2005), 223.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Qiu Dali and Zhang Lihua, “Strategic consideration of the development of the army,” Journal of PLA National Defense University 3 (2003): 29.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Xia Fuguo, “Bianjing diqu fangyu zuozhanzhong shishi feijiechu zuozhan ying guoche yifang weizhu youxian fanji de sixiang” [Implement defense as the chief principle but with limited counterattack in the nonengagement warfare for the land border defense], Journal of PLA National Defense University 5 (2003): 42.

    Google Scholar 

  40. Liu Yongxin, “Liangsuo fanying beijing xia bianjing fangyu zhanyizhidao” [Guiding principle for counter-attack campaigns in the border regions], Military Art 3 (2003): 39.

    Google Scholar 

  41. Xia Fuguo, “Bianjing diqu fangyu zuozhanzhong shishi feijiechu zuozhan ying guoche yifang weizhu youxian fanji de sixiang” [Implement defense as the chief principle but with limited counter-attack in the nonengagement warfare for the land border defense], Journal of PLA National Defense University 5 (2003): 42.

    Google Scholar 

  42. According to an experiment, a PLA field unit launched an attack on a mountain pass within a range of two kilometers. It took hours for the units to move to the point of final assault. In the last 150 meters, the soldiers had two breaks before the charge. By then most of them were physically exhausted, and a number collapsed. Ligong Chen, Liangsou fanying beijingxia gaohan shandi bianjing fanyu zuozhan yanjiu (Beijing: PLA National Defense University Press, 2005), 41.

    Google Scholar 

  43. See Zhang Shuyun et al., “The combat methods for future counter-attack united campaigns in cold high plateau, grasslands and desserts in the border region”; and Major General Ma Diankui, “Information operations in the united campaigns in the grasslands and desserts in the border region,” in Military Art: Studies of Information Operations of our Military (Beijing: PLA National University Defense Press, 1999), 222–34.

    Google Scholar 

  44. Wang Xixin, “Guiding principle for anti-terrorist operations in the border areas,” Journal of PLA National Defense University 5 (2003): 42.

    Google Scholar 

  45. Major General Jia Fengshan, Frontier Topics of the Military Studies (Beijing: PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 2004), 382–84.

    Google Scholar 

  46. Wang Boming, “Grasp the texture of long distance mobile warfare, joint warfare and non-engagement warfare and realize the double historical tasks of PLA transformation,” Journal of PLA National Defense University 3 (2003): 30.

    Google Scholar 

  47. The resolution of the fifth meeting of the bilateral border negotiations was in May 2005. See also Huang Xiangping, “A comprehensive review of the literature on the Sino-Indian border disputes,” Nanye yanjiu 3 (2005): 77–83.

    Google Scholar 

  48. Pao Mingxi, “The plight and status of female North Koreans in China,” Yazhou yanjiu [Asian Studies] 52 (2005): 101.

    Google Scholar 

  49. PLA Academy of Military Science, The Future National Defense (Beijing: PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 1988), 142–43.

    Google Scholar 

  50. Gao Yujing, “Equipment maintenance for group armies in trans-regional mobility,” Journal of PLA National Defense University 8 (2004): 85.

    Google Scholar 

  51. Pan Youmu, Research on Non-engagement Warfare (Beijing: PLA National Defense University Press, 2003), 95.

    Google Scholar 

  52. Li Shiheng and Yu Yingbo of the PLA Air Force, “Exploration of IW of the air force in the counter-attack campaigns in the border regions,” in Junshixueshu, ed. Chen Ligong, Chen Ligong, Liangsou fanying beijingxia gaohan shandi bianjing fanyu zuozhan yanjiu (Studying mountainous warfare under the situation of multiple war), Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2005, 172–210.

    Google Scholar 

  53. Taiwan is not the focus of this paper. For a detailed discussion on China’s potential naval operations in the Taiwan Strait, see You Ji, “China’s New National Defence Strategy, Naval Transformation and The Taiwan Conflict,” Stockholm Journal of East Asian Studies 15 (2005): 75–88. U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice criticized the referendum as provocative and unhelpful in her end-of-year news briefing on December 22, 2007.

    Google Scholar 

  54. Hu Shisheng, “Indian Ocean and China’s Maritime Security,” in Sea Lane Security and International Cooperation, ed. China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2006), 253.

    Google Scholar 

  55. Zhang Wenmu, “Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choice,” China Security (Summer 2006): 23.

    Google Scholar 

  56. Senior Colonel Liu Yijian, The Command of Sea and the Strategic Employment of Naval Forces (Beijing: PLA National Defense University Press, 2004), 233. Commodore Liu obtained his doctoral degree in military science in the 1990s, being one of the first naval officers to obtain such an award.

    Google Scholar 

  57. An Weihua, “The southern line of oil transportation: the balance of the four major routes,” Shijie zhishi 8 (2006): 17.

    Google Scholar 

  58. Pak Lee, “China’s Quest for Oil Security: Oil (War) in the Pipeline?” Pacific Review 18, no. 2 (2005): 269.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  59. Bruce Blair, Chen Yali, and Eric Hagt, “The Oil Weapon: Myth of China’s Vulnerability,” China Security (Summer 2006): 5.

    Google Scholar 

  60. See also Yang Zhongjian, “Sino-US interaction over oil supply,” Zhongguo guoqingguoli [China National Conditions and Strength] 7 (2004): 6.

    Google Scholar 

  61. You Ji, “The Rise of China and Its Implications on the ASEAN-EU-America Triangle Relations,” Panorama: Insights into Southeast Asian and European Affairs 2 (2004): 71–92.

    Google Scholar 

  62. Liu Xuecheng, The Sino-Indian Border Disputes and Sino-Indian Relations (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994).

    Google Scholar 

  63. Wang Lirong, “India in the South China Sea dispute,” Nanyayanju [South Asian Studies] 3 (2005): 51.

    Google Scholar 

  64. Cheng Jidong and Zhouren, “Cooperation and contention between China and India in acquiring new oil resources,” Nanyayanju [South Asian Studies] 3 (2005): 14–19.

    Google Scholar 

  65. Senior Colonel Guo Yanhua, Research on Military Modernization of the Major Powers (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2004), 269.

    Google Scholar 

  66. Colonel Ding Hao, “On Indian Military Theory,” Beijing: PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 2005).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 2008 Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris, and Qin Yaqing

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Ji, Y. (2008). China’s “New” Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, and Defense Strategy. In: Kerr, P., Harris, S., Qin, Y. (eds) China’s “New” Diplomacy. Palgrave Series in Asian Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-61692-9_5

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics