Abstract
In 1874 the Qing Imperial Court initiated a debate on the nation’s diplomatic and defense strategy. The central question was whether to prioritize on coastal defense in order to resist foreign naval invasion, Jiangfang, or on land-border defense to recover Xinjiang, Saifang.1 Although the coastal defense was not weakened, the Qing Court had raised the stake of land-border defense for a period of time in which the military received enough resources to recover Xinjiang. In realizing this adjustment of national defense priority, Beijing initiated intense diplomatic maneuvering: adopting a “passive foreign policy” toward oceanic powers to avoid confrontation, largely through making further concessions. In the meantime, tough diplomacy was taken against the penetration of continental powers along land borders. This was backed by military plans.
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Notes
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© 2008 Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris, and Qin Yaqing
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Ji, Y. (2008). China’s “New” Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, and Defense Strategy. In: Kerr, P., Harris, S., Qin, Y. (eds) China’s “New” Diplomacy. Palgrave Series in Asian Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-61692-9_5
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