G. E. M. Anscombe: Was Wittgenstein a Linguistic Idealist?

Abstract

In her paper ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’ (in her Collected Philosophical Paper. vol. 1, 1981), G. E. M. Anscombe considers the question whether Wittgenstein is a ‘linguistic idealist’. She does so probingly: she is not concerned to defend, but to find out, to let the truth come out and speak for itself. Her test for linguistic idealism is: Is this truth, this existence, the product of human linguistic practice? (pp. 116, 121). She applies it to Wittgenstein and what she finds is, in her words, a ‘partial idealism’ (p. 118). The existence of human concepts does of course depend on the existence of a great variety of human linguistic practices; but what falls under these concepts does not (p. 118). The natural numbers are no more ‘a human invention’ than horses, wolves, deer or days (p. 117). Wittgenstein did not deny any of this. But there are a great many things whose existence does depend on human linguistic practice. She mentions rules, rights and promises. Thus when one makes a promise, one gives one’s word, and this create. the obligation to keep it. This obligation belongs to a promise: a promise is not a mere pronouncement, an empty word; it is of its essence that it should be kept. This obligation thus belongs to the essenc. of promising. Therefore here we have an example where a linguistic practice, promising, create. the essence of what we call a promise — of what falls under the concept of a promise.