Abstract
As discussed in Chapter 1, the standard policy response to the inflationary bias caused by discretionary monetary policy-making is the delegation of monetary policy to an independent institution. Directly linked and complementary to independence is the concept of accountability. Research on CB accountability is relatively recent and the literature is still evolving. Relatively few authors have focused on empirical measures of accountability, including Briault, Haldane, and King (1996), de Haan, Amtenbrink, and Eijffinger (1998), Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2000 and 2001), Stasavage (2003), and Siklos (2002). The literature we survey spans eight years, a period during which accountability indices have been refined. While there is still a lack of consensus among academics and practitioners, progress has been made in understanding the contributions of the different variables to a measure of CB accountability.
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© 2009 International Monetary Fund
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Laurens, B.J., Arnone, M., Segalotto, JF. (2009). Survey of Models and Indicators of Accountability. In: Central Bank Independence, Accountability, and Transparency. Procyclicality of Financial Systems in Asia. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-28212-4_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-28212-4_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-58563-2
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-28212-4
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