Abstract
The invasion and partition of Yugoslavia in April 1941 began three and half years of harsh occupation which destroyed the embryonic political structures established during the latter years of Prince Paul’s regency. During this period elements among the Yugoslav peoples openly fought one another, leaving a legacy of violence and bitterness which festered beneath the surface of the post-war régime. Two principal and paradoxical impressions of the occupation emerge. The first, and more conventional view is that German rule was a colonial conquest sustained by dismemberment together with an active policy of ruthless suppression in a manner designed to keep the country divided and at war against itself. The second view is that the Reich’s interest in this region was its use as a thoroughfare and that what the Germans wanted to achieve primarily was the pacification of the Balkans so that it would not be a drain on German manpower resources. The truth, as so often, was a mixture of the two. Initially, the occupiers parcelled out land to parties aggrieved by the First World War settlement. They also sought to appease disaffected elements within Yugoslavia itself, the Croats being the most notable example of this strategy in action. However, this proved unworkable, for reasons arising from the behaviour of the assortment of quisling and fascist Yugoslavs who were placed between the occupation authorities and the people, and as a result of the shortcomings in the relationship between the Italians and the Germans in the region. In short, the lands of Yugoslavia were to provide a constant source of concern to the Third Reich, driving them to implement a progressively more punitive occupation with deleterious results both for the occupiers and for the Yugoslavs themselves.
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Notes
S. Trifkovich, ‘Rivalry Between Germany and Italy in Croatia, 1942–1943’, The Historical Journal, vol. 36, no. 4, (1993), p. 882; Jelavich, History of the Balkans, p. 263.
S.K. Pavlowitch, ‘The King who Never Was: An Instance of Italian Involvement in Croatia, 1941–43’, European Studies Review, vol. 8, (1978), pp. 465–87.
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See M.J. Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and Yugoslav Resistance, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975)
J. Tomasevich, The Chetniks. War and Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941–45, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975).
C. Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, (London: Pinter for RIIA, 1991), pp. 19–20.
Quoted in D. Wilson, Tito’s Yugoslavia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 21.
W.R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies 1943–1945, (Rutgers University Press, 1973), pp. 76–8
D.Wilson, Tito’s Yugoslavia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 25.
P. Hehn (ed.), The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II: German Counter-Insurgency in Yugoslavia 1941–1943, (New York and Boulder: East European Monographs, 1975), pp. 335.
M. Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance, (Baltimore and London: 1975), pp. 149–50, quoted in Trifkovic, ‘Rivalry Between Germany and Italy in Croatia, p. 898.
A. Dallin and F.I. Firsov, Dimitrov and Stalin 1934–1943. Letters from the Soviet Archives, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 216–17.
A. Lane, ‘Perfidious Albion? Britain and the Struggle for Mastery of Yugoslavia 1941–1944: A Re-examination in the Light of ‘New’ Evidence’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 7, no. 2, (July 1996), pp. 345–77.
F.W. Deakin, The Embattled Mountain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
F.H. Maclean, Eastern Approaches, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1949).
For example N. Beloff, Tito’s Flawed Legacy, (London: Gollancz, 1985)
D. Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill’s Yugoslav Blunder, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991).
M.C. Wheeler, ‘Pariahs to Partisans to Power: the Communist Party of Yugoslavia’, in T. Judt, ed., Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe 1939–48, (New York: Routledge, 1989).
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© 2004 Ann Lane
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Lane, A. (2004). Civil War and Communist Revolution. In: Yugoslavia: When Ideals Collide. The Making of the 20th Century. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-21407-1_5
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