Abstract
A number of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) at the global and regional level have adopted labour-related safeguard policies to avoid that projects financed by them contribute to labour standards violations. This chapter analyses the potential of these safeguards to contribute to the protection of the Core Labour Standard, as defined by the ILO. To this end, the chapter looks, first, at the safeguards’ legal design. It reviews the normative content of selected IFI labour safeguards and assesses their relation with relevant ILO instruments, highlighting a number of inconsistencies in this regard. Furthermore, the chapter scrutinizes the scope of relevant labour safeguards, revealing several loopholes that may provide borrowers with avenues to avoid many of the safeguards’ requirements by adjusting the project structure. Secondly, the chapter assesses the safeguards’ practical implications. To this end, it examines the mechanisms established by several IFIs to prevent and remedy violations of the safeguards’ requirements. In addition, the chapter reviews evidence on the safeguards’ application, highlighting positive outcomes in several cases despite an overall mixed picture. The concluding section points to some general caveats that may hamper the safeguards overall effectiveness and emphasises the need for more comprehensive mechanisms to protect workers with regard to IFI activities.
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Notes
- 1.
For the purpose of this article, a broad understanding of the term “international financial institution” is adopted, comprising international organisations providing financial services to public or private actors. This includes institutions at the global level, the regional level, and the sub-regional level. For a similar definition see Ragazzi (2012a), para. 1.
- 2.
- 3.
For an example concerning the IMF from the 1990s, relating to trade union rights, see Darrow (2003), p. 183.
- 4.
See, e.g., Ebert (2015), pp. 129–132.
- 5.
- 6.
For an overview see Bohoslavsky and Ebert (2018), pp. 285–286.
- 7.
- 8.
See O’Brien (2014), p. 158.
- 9.
The IMF does not carry out such investment projects and is therefore not included in this analysis.
- 10.
See, e.g., Bakvis and McCoy (2008), pp. 5–6.
- 11.
See e.g. ITUC (2011), pp. 19–26; Human Rights Watch (2014) World Bank: Investigate Uzbekistan’s Forced Labor. Inspection Panel Should Ensure Funds Not Used for Abuses. Washington. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/17/world-bank-investigate-uzbekistans-forced-labor and Connel T (2016) Uzbekistan Forced Labor Linked to World Bank Loan, available at: https://www.solidaritycenter.org/uzbekistan-forced-labor-victim-files-worldbank-complaint/, highlighting, among others, instances of forced labour in projects in the cotton sector of Uzbekistan and child labour in a project in the Ugandan telecommunication sector, respectively, financed by the World Bank and the IFC, respectively.
- 12.
- 13.
See further La Hovary (2009), pp. 49–51.
- 14.
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, adopted 18 June 1998, para. 2. The relevant conventions are Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105); Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138); Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182); Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100); Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111); Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
- 15.
The World Bank is composed of two international organisations, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). While IBRD mainly deals with middle-income countries, IDA focusses on the most impoverished countries. See further on the institutional setting of these two organisations; Schlemmer-Schulte (2012), especially paras. 1, 65, 97.
- 16.
All of these form part of the World Bank Group; see further Ragazzi (2012b), paras. 1–7. While the IFC offers a variety of financial and other services to private companies, MIGA mainly focusses on providing guarantees to investors undertaking business projects in developing countries. See Asrani and Dann (2012), paras. 11–14 and Schill (2012), paras. 20–29.
- 17.
The African Development Bank Group is made up of the African Development Bank as well as the African Development Fund and the Nigeria Trust Fund. Similarly to the World Bank’s IDA, the African Development Fund provides finance on concessional terms to the low-income countries of the region. This is also the purpose of the Nigeria Trust Fund, which was established by means of an agreement between the African Development Bank and Nigeria and is funded by this country. See at: https://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/corporate-information/ and further Suzuki (2012), paras. 15 and 28.
- 18.
Established after the end of the Cold War, the EBRD was set up to deal with the countries of the former Soviet Union as well as with the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, see Suzuki (2012), para. 10.
- 19.
The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank was created in the context of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (see further Tiroch 2012, para. 24). It provides funding for projects in the Bank’s 11 member countries, which includes the countries bordering the Black Sea as well as some other countries from the region; see at https://www.bstdb.org/about-us/who-we-are.
- 20.
Created by Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa, the New Development Bank, the New Development Bank aims to provide funding to BRICS countries and other countries from the Global South; see at: https://www.ndb.int/about-us/essence/mission-values/. Similarly to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank sponsored by China, the New Development Bank can arguably be understood as an effort to create additional alternatives to the World Bank that is often perceived as dominated by the United States; see Wang (2017), p. 114.
- 21.
The term borrower is used here to describe all entities receiving funds from IFIs regardless of whether they are active in the public or private sector.
- 22.
Some also involve a general vision statement; see e.g. the World Bank, A Vision for Sustainable Development (2016) and AfDB, African Developments Bank Group’s Integrated Safeguards System (ISS) (2013), p. 15.
- 23.
See, e.g., EBRD Environmental and Social Exclusion List, in EBRD, Environmental and Social Policy (2014), Appendix 1, p. 8.
- 24.
IFC (1998) Policy Statement on Forced Labor and Harmful Child Labor. Washington.
- 25.
The Sustainability Framework is composed of a Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability, the Performance Standards on Environmental & Social Sustainability, and an Access to Information Policy. See IFC’s dedicated website at: https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability-at-ifc/policies-standards/sustainability+framework.
- 26.
IFC (2012) Performance Standards on Social & Environmental Sustainability.
- 27.
Among others, a number of private banks adopted the “Equator Principles” in 2003 which extensively draw on the IFC’s Performance Standards. See further Sims E (2009) The promotion of respect for workers’ rights in the banking sector: Current practice and future prospects, Employment Sector Employment Working Paper No. 26, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/@multi/documents/publication/wcms_125545.pdf, pp. 18–21. These Principles were revised in 2006 and updated in 2011 to incorporate the content of the IFC Performance Standards. See Equator Principles, Equator Principles, The Newly Revised IFC Performance Standards—Guidance on Implementation by EP Association Members from 1 January 2012, http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/all-ep-association-news/254-revised-ps.
- 28.
See on this Murphy (2014), p. 409.
- 29.
MIGA (2013) Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, Washington; MIGA (2013) Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability, Washington (hereinafter MIGA Sustainability Policy), MIGA (2013) Access to Information Policy, Washington.
- 30.
Meanwhile, other major regional IFIs, such as the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, as of now, do not seem to have adopted a labour safeguard.
- 31.
For example, the AfDB’s safeguards apply to both the Bank’s public and the private sector operations; see AfDB, Operational Safeguard 1—Environmental and Social Assessment (2013), p. 22.
- 32.
Yifeng (2018), p. 113 speaks of a “succinct version of an environmental and social policy […] with a brief reference to labour standards”.
- 33.
See Yifeng (2018), p. 113 on whose work this categorization is based.
- 34.
NDB, ESS1: Environmental and Social Assessment (2016), para. 22.
- 35.
See AIIB, Environmental and Social Standard 1: Environmental and Social Assessment and Management (2016), section D and AIIB, Environmental and Social Exclusion List (2016).
- 36.
AIIB, Environmental and Social Standard 1: Environmental and Social Assessment and Management (2016), section D. Requirements regarding “workers’ organizations and collective bargaining” concern exclusively the “compliance with national law”; ibid.
- 37.
NIB’s safeguards state that “[r]espect for workers’ rights and their freedom of association is part of good business”, that NIB “does not accept discrimination”, and that “workers’ […] safety and health s essential for the productivity and efficiency of the business”. Further, this safeguard policy declares that “[u]se of forced labour is not accepted by NIB” and that “NIB requires the client to comply with international standards for the employment of minors”. NIB, Sustainability Policy (2012), p. 2.
- 38.
BSTDB-financed projects must comply with relevant domestic and EU labour law; see BSTDB, Environmental and Social Policy (2014), p. 6. In addition, the BSTDB safeguards contain references to the ILO Core Labour Standards, ILO conventions regarding forced and child labour, and, somewhat obscurely, “the fundamental human rights for decent work and social justice”, ibid., p. 3. Confusingly, the safeguards also consider “the right for decent work” and “respect for health and safety” as part of the ILO’s Core Labour Standards, ibid., pp. 2–3. The safeguards make it clear though that these issues are dealt with “depending on their relevance on each particular case”, ibid., p. 4. Further, financial intermediaries supported by BSTDB are required to ensure the application of relevant labour requirements vis-à-vis their sub-borrowers, ibid., p. 5.
- 39.
Similar standards are contained in the safeguards of the European Investment Bank (EIB); see EIB, EIB Environmental and Social Standard 8, Version 10.0 of 8 October 2018. Labour Standards. However, given that the EIB is, as an EU institution, rather than an IFI proper, it will not be considered in the following.
- 40.
See below Sect. 2.1.2.
- 41.
See World Bank, Environmental and Social Standard 2. Labor and Working Conditions (2016) (WB ESS2), paras. 24–30; IFC, Performance Standard 2. Labor and Working Conditions (2012) (IFC PS2), para. 23; MIGA Performance Standard 2. Labor and Working Conditions (2013) (MIGA PS2), para. 23.
- 42.
EBRD, EBRD Performance Requirement 4. Health and Safety (2014) (EBRD PR4).
- 43.
See IFC PS2, paras. 18–19; MIGA PS2, paras. 18–19; AfDB, Operational Safeguard 5—Labour Conditions, Health and Safety (2013) (AfDB OS5), p. 50 as well as EBRD, Performance Requirement 2: Labour and Working Conditions (2014) (EBRD PR2), para. 19.
- 44.
See IFC PS2, para. 11; MIGA PS2, para. 11; EBRD PR2, para. 16. AfDB OS5, p. 49 speaks, more ambiguously, of “comparable terms and conditions”.
- 45.
See WB ESS2, paras. 10–12; IFC PS2, para. 10; MIGA PS2, para. 10; EBRD PR2, para. 15; AfDB OS5, p. 49.
- 46.
See WB ESS2, paras. 21–23; IFC PS2, para. 20; MIGA PS2, para. 20; EBRD PR2, para. 20; AfDB OS5, p. 50.
- 47.
See notably IFC, Performance Standard 1. Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts (2012) (IFC PS1), para. 6; MIGA, Performance Standard 1. Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts (2013) (MIGA PS1), para. 6; EBRD PR2, para. 5.
- 48.
See IFC PS2, para. 2; MIGA PS2, para. 2 (“have been in part guided by”, respectively). See also World Bank, Guidance Note for Borrowers. ESS2: Labor and Working Conditions (2018) (WB ESS GN2), para. 2.2 (“is in part informed by”); EBRD PR2, para. 2 (referring to the four ILO Fundamental Conventions), AfDB OS5, p. 49 (stating as a “specific objective” to “[a]lign Bank requirements with the ILO Core Labor Standards”).
- 49.
See IFC, Guidance Note 2. Labor and Working Conditions (2012) (IFC GN2), para. 2 (“By applying Performance Standard 2, the client will be able to operate its business in a manner consistent with the four core ILO labour Conventions”); World Bank, Review and Update of the World Bank’s Safeguard Policies Environmental and Social Framework (Proposed Third Draft). Strengthening the Effectiveness of our Safeguard Policies to Enhance the Development Outcomes of Bank Operations (August 2016), paras. 66 and 95 (“[a]ll core labor standards are reflected in the proposed labor provisions” and “[ESS2] reflects the core principles of ILO’s Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work”, respectively).
- 50.
EBRD PR2, para. 5.
- 51.
EBRD PR2, para. 5, footnote 4.
- 52.
For a similar point in relation to labour provisions in trade agreements see Agustí-Panareda et al. (2015), pp. 363–367.
- 53.
See, e.g., IFC PS2, para. 22; MIGA PS2, para. 22; WB ESS2, para. 20; EBRD PR2, para. 11; AfDB OS5, p. 50.
- 54.
IFC GN2, para. 67, footnote 15. IFC’s Performance Standard 2 defines “forced labour” as “any work or service not voluntarily performed that is exacted from an individual under threat of force or penalty” (IFC PS2, para. 22). Meanwhile, Article 2 (1) of the ILO’s Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) sets out the following definition of this term: “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily”.
- 55.
EBRD PR2, para. 9.
- 56.
AfDB OS5, p. 50.
- 57.
IFC PS2, para. 21. Only for “hazardous work,” a minimum age is foreseen.
- 58.
MIGA expressly refers to the IFC’s Guidance Note on the Performance Standards; see https://www.miga.org/guidelines-policy.
- 59.
IFC GN2, paras. 61, 62 and 64. The general age limit is set at 15 years. This age limit can for developing countries, however, be reduced to 14 years if certain conditions are met. Furthermore, children of at least 13 years can perform certain forms of light work. See Articles 2(3–5) and 7(1) of the ILO’s Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138).
- 60.
Compare WB ESS2, Para. 17 to Article 2(3) of the ILO Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138).
- 61.
See prominently WB ESS2, paras. 13 and 16. Regarding IFC’s PS2, see further Ebert (2014), pp. 235–237.
- 62.
Cf. EBRD PR2, para. 12.
- 63.
See, e.g., IFC PS2, para. 16; MIGA PS2, para. 16; WB ESS2, para. 13; AfDB OS5, p. 50.
- 64.
WB ESS2, para. 13. For a similar provision see IFC PS2, para. 16; MIGA PS2, para. 16.
- 65.
See notably the ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) as well as the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111).
- 66.
Cf. AfDB OS5, pp. 49–50.
- 67.
See, with regard to the World Bank, Van Den Meersche (2017), p. 171.
- 68.
See notably the ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) as well as the ILO Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
- 69.
WB ESS2, para 16; IFC PS2, para. 14; MIGA PS2, para. 14; EBRD PR2, para. 13. As concerns EBRD, it is unclear how the relevant provision relates to the requirement to comply with “the fundamental principles and standards” of the ILO Fundamental Conventions, two of which deal with trade union rights; EBRD PR2, para. 5.
- 70.
It should also be noted that some safeguards contain different standards for projects carried out through financial intermediaries. See, e.g., World Bank, Environmental and Social Standard 9. Financial Intermediaries (2016).
- 71.
IFC PS2 and MIGA PS2, para. 4 in conjunction with para. 5, respectively; WB ESS2, para. 3 (a) in conjunction with para. 4.
- 72.
IFC PS2, para. 4; MIGA PS2, para. 4; WB ESS2, para. 3 (a), the latter using the formulation “employed or engaged directly”.
- 73.
EBRD PR2, para. 4. It is not entirely clear whether the term “employee” is to be understood as under the domestic law applicable to the project or whether an autonomous understanding could apply in certain cases. Furthermore, it should be noted though that EBRD’s dedicated health and safety safeguard also comprises certain “non-employee workers engaged by the client through contractors or other intermediaries”. EBRD PR4, para. 8. This is on the condition that they have been hired “to work on project sites or perform work directly related to the core functions of the project”; ibid.
- 74.
See AfDB OS5, pp. 49–51.
- 75.
Reportedly, workers directly hired by the borrower are oftentimes in the minority in projects financed by IFIs; see Government of Germany, German Comments on the World Bank Safeguards Review (April 2015), p. 3.
- 76.
See WB ESS2, para. 5 in conjunction with paras. 31–33; AfDB OS5, p. 51. Requirements on retrenchment embodied in IFC’s, MIGA’s and EBRD’s safeguards do not apply to contracted workers; see IFC PS2, para. 24; MIGA PS2, para. 24; EBRD PR2, para. 21.
- 77.
See IFC PS2, para. 24; MIGA PS2, para. 24; EBRD PR2, para. 21. For similar wording see WB ESS2, para. 31. AfDB’s safeguards formulate this obligation in a way that appears to impose a higher standard of conduct on the borrower (“the borrower or client ascertains”); AfDB OS5, p. 51.
- 78.
See WB ESS2, paras. 32 and 33 (quote at para. 32); IFC PS2 and MIGA PS2, paras. 25 and 26 (quote at para. 25), respectively; EBRD PR2, paras. 22 and 23 (quote at para. 22). For similar wording, albeit without references to grievance mechanisms, see AfDB OS5, p. 51.
- 79.
See WB ESS2, para. 32; AfDB OS5, p. 51. AfDB also extends this requirement to “subcontractors and intermediaries”; AfDB OS5, p. 51. Similarly, the World Bank’s ESS2 contains a requirement to ensure that contractors “include equivalent requirements and non-compliance remedies in their contractual agreements with subcontractors”; WB ESS2, para. 32.
- 80.
See, e.g., IFC PS2, para. 25; MIGA PS2, para. 25; EBRD PR2, para. 22.
- 81.
See, e.g., IFC PS2, para. 27; MIGA PS2, para. 27; EBRD PR2, para. 24; AfDB OS5, p. 51. The relevant provisions under the World Bank’s ESF are slightly less demanding in this regard given that here the borrower merely has to “require” its supplier to detect such risks; WB ESS2, para. 40.
- 82.
IFC PS2, para. 27; MIGA PS2, para. 27; WB ESS2, para. 40; AfDB OS5, p. 51.
- 83.
IFC PS2, para. 27; MIGA PS2, para. 27; EBRD PR2, para. 25; AfDB OS5, p. 51. Under the ESF, the borrower only has to obligate the supplier to carry out these measures; WB ESS2, para. 40.
- 84.
IFC PS2, para. 27; MIGA PS2, para. 27; EBRD PR2, para. 25. The World Bank’s ESF only provides that “[t]he labor management procedures [] set out roles and responsibilities” in this regard; WB ESS2, para. 40.
- 85.
See EBRD PR2, para. 25.
- 86.
IFC PS2, para. 28; MIGA PS2, para. 28; WB ESS2, para. 41; AfDB OS5, p. 51.
- 87.
WB ESS2, para. 41; EBRD PR2, para. 25. IFC PS2 and MIGA PS2, para. 28, respectively, limit the need for such preventive measures to the avoidance of “life-threatening situations” while AfDB OS5, p. 51 confines it to “imminent danger, death or serious harm to workers”.
- 88.
See WB ESS2, para. 42; IFC PS2, para. 29; MIGA PS2, para. 29; AfDB OS5, p. 51; EBRD PR2, para. 25.
- 89.
WB ESS2, para. 3(d).
- 90.
WB ESS2, para. 34 footnote 23.
- 91.
WB ESS2, para. 35. Whether the ESS2’s requirements apply to community workers mainly depends on this being “proportionate” to “a) the nature and scope of the project; (b) the specific project activities in which the community workers are engaged; and (c) the nature of the potential risks and impacts to the community workers.” Ibid.
- 92.
WB ESS2, para. 37.
- 93.
See IFC PS2, para. 4; MIGA PS2, para. 4; WB ESS2, para. 3 b).
- 94.
WB ESS2, para. 3 b; IFC PS2, para. 4; MIGA PS2, para. 4.
- 95.
WB ESS2, para. 3 b, footnote 4; IFC PS2 and MIGA PS2, para. 4, footnote 3, respectively.
- 96.
The Guidance Notes to both the IFC’s Performance Standards and the World Bank’s ESF do not further elucidate this aspect; cf. IFC GN2, paras. 11–12 and 84–92 and WB ESS GN2, paras. 3.5, 4.1, 7.1.
- 97.
This problem is partly avoided by EBRD’s labour safeguards, which aside from “non-employee workers” “perform[ing] core functions of the project” also include those “work[ing] on project sites”; EBRD PR2, para. 21. A similar point can be made for AfDB’s labour safeguards which includes all “workers procured by third parties to work directly on or support the project”; AfDB OS5, p. 51.
- 98.
WB ESS2, para. 3 c, footnote 5; IFC PS2 and MIGA PS2, para. 4, footnote 4, respectively.
- 99.
EBRD PR2, para. 24. See also EBRD PR2, para. 25 in conjunction with para. 24.
- 100.
AfDB OS5, p. 51.
- 101.
For a critical analysis in this regard see Sarfaty (2012), pp. 137–139.
- 102.
See IFC PS1, paras. 7–12; MIGA PS1, paras. 7–12; World Bank Environmental and Social Standard 1. Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts (2016) (WB ESS1), paras. 23–35; EBRD, Performance Requirement 1. Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Impacts and Issues (2014), paras. 4, 7–9. Different rules apply usually if the IFI’s investment is made by means of financial intermediaries; see, e.g., EBRD, Environmental and Social Policy (2014) (EBRD ESP), para. 28.
- 103.
See IFC, Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability (2012) (IFC Sustainability Policy), paras. 26 and 28; MIGA Sustainability Policy, paras. 26 and 28; World Bank, World Bank Environmental and Social Policy for Investment Project Financing (2016) (WB ESP), paras. 30–32; EBRD ESP, paras. 29–35.
- 104.
See, e.g., WB ESP, para. 32.
- 105.
WB ESS1, para. 25. See also EBRD PR1, para. 10, referring to “independent experts”.
- 106.
See IFC PS1, paras. 25–28; MIGA PS1, paras. 25–28; WB ESP, para. 53; AfDB, Operational Safeguard 1. Environmental and Social Assessment (2013) (AfDB OS1), pp. 27–28; EBRD, PR1, para. 10.
- 107.
See IFC Sustainability Policy, para. 40; MIGA Sustainability Policy, para. 38; WB ESP, para. 20; AfDB OS1, pp. 24–25; EBRD PR1, para. 10–13.
- 108.
See, e.g., AfDB OS1, p. 23; EBRD PR1, para. 17–20.
- 109.
See, e.g., WB ESP, para. 46; EBRD PR1, paras. 17–19.
- 110.
See, e.g., IFC PS1, paras. 22–24; WB ESS1, paras. 40, 45–50; EBRD PR1, para. 24.
- 111.
See, e.g., IFC PS1, para. 35; MIGA PS1, para. 35; WB ESP, para. 60–61; AfDB OS1, p. 29; EBRD, Performance Requirement 10. Information Disclosure and Stakeholder Engagement (2014), para. 28.
- 112.
- 113.
In the case of the World Bank’s ESF, this is exacerbated by the strong reliance on the borrower country’s laws and institutions, which can substitute for the Bank’s Environmental and Social Standards if the Bank considers them “materially consistent” there with; WB ESP, para. 23. See further Van Den Meersche (2017), pp. 166–168.
- 114.
WB ESS1 stipulates, for example that the borrower “will assess, manage and monitor the environmental and social risks and impacts of the project […] so as to meet the requirements of the ESSs in a manner and within a timeframe acceptable to the Bank” (emphasis added). WB ESS1, para. 14.
- 115.
Among others, the World Bank’s safeguards provide a “draft ESCP will be disclosed as early as possible, and before project appraisal”, see WB ESP, para. 36. See further Dann and Riegner (2017), p. 11.
- 116.
See ITUC (2011), p. 19.
- 117.
See ITUC/Global Unions Washington Office, Trade Union Communication Mechanism for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2019), p. 1.
- 118.
World Bank Inspection Panel Updated Operating Procedures (2014) (WBIP Procedures), paras. 7–8.
- 119.
For a submission to be eligible a party needs to demonstrate that “its interests have been or are likely to be directly affected by an action or omission of the Bank as a result of a failure of the Bank to follow its operational policies and procedures with respect to the design, appraisal and/or implementation of a project financed by the Bank”. See IBRD and IDA (1993) The World Bank Inspection Panel Resolution (Res. No. IBRD 93-10, Res. No. IDA 93-6), para. 12.
- 120.
WBIP Procedures, para. 6.
- 121.
See further Naudé Fourie (2009), especially at pp. 177–181.
- 122.
See further Carrasco and Guernsey (2008), pp. 595–597.
- 123.
WBIP Procedures, para. 71.
- 124.
See Wong and Mayer (2015), p. 506.
- 125.
See ibid., pp. 506–507.
- 126.
- 127.
See, e.g., IFC/MIGA, CAO Operational Guidelines (2013) (CAO Guidelines), p. 4.
- 128.
See, e.g., African Development Bank/African Development Fund Board of Directors, Resolution B/BD/2015/03—F/BD/2010/04 concerning the Independent Review Mechanism (2015), p. 1.
- 129.
See CAO Guidelines, p. 5; EBRD, Project Complaint Mechanism (PCM). Rules of Procedure (2014) (EBRD PCM Procedure), p. 1. An advisory function is performed by the CAO and the AfDB’s IRM but not by the EBRD’s PCM; see AfDB, The Independent Review Mechanism. Operating Rules and Procedures (2015) (AfDB IRM Procedure), paras. 68–77; CAO Guidelines, pp. 28–29.
- 130.
See, e.g., CAO Guidelines, pp. 13–15, 18; AfDB IRM Procedure, para. 42; EBRD PCM Procedure, paras. 36–39.
- 131.
See CAO Guidelines, pp. 14, 16; AfDB IRM Procedure, para. 50; EBRD PCM Procedure, para. 40. In the case of the CAO, the compliance investigation is subject to a positive “compliance appraisal” by the CAO and can also be set in motion by MIGA’s and IFC’s senior management, the President of the World Bank Group, and the CAO itself. See CAO Guidelines, pp. 22–23.
- 132.
See CAO Guidelines, p. 24.
- 133.
CAO Guidelines, p. 25.
- 134.
The World Bank Inspection Panel can decline an investigation also if the submission fulfils the “technical eligibility criteria for an investigation”, considering, for example, the severity of the “alleged harm and possible non-compliance by the Bank with its operational policies”. World Bank Inspection Panel Updated Operating Procedures (2014), paras. 41 and 43 lit. a. On AfDB’s dispute resolution procedure see AfDB IRM Procedure, para. 39. On the CAO’s compliance procedure see CAO Guidelines, p. 23; Saper (2012), p. 1303.
- 135.
See EBRD PCM Procedure, para. 36. Here, the decision is with the President.
- 136.
With regard to the AfDB’s recourse mechanism, the investigation is subject to the approval of the Group’s Board or President; see AfDB IRM Procedure, paras. 53–55. In the case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, it is the Board that must authorise the initiation of the Panel’s investigation; WBIP Procedures, para. 49. That being said, the Board normally grants the authorization without entering into a discussion of the request’s merits. See ibid and World Bank Group, Clarification of the Board’s Second Review of the Inspection Panel (1999), para. 9.
- 137.
See, e.g., CAO Guidelines, p. 4. Although the CAO’s reports are usually public, the President of the World Bank Group can bar the compliance report from being published. See CAO Guidelines, p. 25.
- 138.
See, e.g., EBRD PCM Procedure, para. 46. In the case of AfDB, the decision rests with the President or the Board, depending on whom approved the project concerned; AfDB IRM Procedure, para. 65.
- 139.
See International Transport Workers’ Federation, Poland’s largest container terminal bans dock union organisers, 11 March 2015, available at: https://www.itfglobal.org/en/news/polands-largest-container-terminal-bans-dock-union-organisers.
- 140.
See World Bank Inspection Panel (2013) Report and Recommendation, Republic of Uzbekistan: Second Rural Enterprise Support Project (P109126) and Additional Financing for Second Rural Enterprise Support Project (P126962) (Report No. 83254-UZ). This case had occurred even before the Bank had adopted its dedicated labour safeguard. See further Ebert (2018), pp. 296–297.
- 141.
See Bakvis and McCoy (2008), p. 6.
- 142.
See Murie (2009) BWI Strategies to Promote Decent Work Through Procurement: The Example of the Bujagali Dam Project in Uganda. GURN Discussion Paper; No. 9. ILO, Geneva, pp. 15–16.
- 143.
Bakvis, Behind the World Bank’s projects in Iraq, Equal Times (19 July 2013), available at: https://www.equaltimes.org/behind-the-world-banks-projects-in-iraq#.XJqVXNh7mM_.
- 144.
See, e.g. ITUC (2011), pp. 19–21 and 25–26 for a description of relevant cases.
- 145.
ITUC (2011), pp. 21, 23 and 27.
- 146.
See the Annex of this chapter. Information on all cases is available on the CAO’s website at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/.
- 147.
See Annex, Cases 3, 6, 10, 11, 15–20, 22, 23–27, 30, 37, 40, 41 and 43.
- 148.
See Annex, Cases 2, 6, 8, 11, 12, 14–17, 19, 28, 30, 32–35, 40, 42 and 43.
- 149.
See Annex, Cases 6–10, 18, 20, 24, 26, 27, 31, 32 and 37.
- 150.
See Annex, Cases 5, 6, 17, 21, 28, and 36, 38 and 39.
- 151.
See Annex, Cases 4 (dealing with sexual harassment), 6, 30, and 31 (dealing with discrimination matters).
- 152.
See Annex, Cases 1, 15 and 28 (dealing with child labour).
- 153.
See Annex, Cases 1, 19, 37 and 43 (dispute resolution stage) as well as Cases 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 30, 33 and 34 (compliance stage).
- 154.
See Annex, Cases 1, 2, 7, 10, 22, 23, 26, 28, 38 and 39.
- 155.
The only exception appears to be Case 29 in the Annex.
- 156.
See Annex, Cases 4–8, 11–13, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 30–35, 41, and 43.
- 157.
E.g. CAO, Appraisal Report. AES Sonel (#11579) Cameroon, 26 June 2014, p. 10. See also Annex, Cases 3, 11, 13, 14, 20, 23–25, 27, 31, 32, 35 and 36.
- 158.
See Sect. 3.1.2 above.
- 159.
CAO, Compliance Appraisal Report. Appraisal of IFC investment in Harmon Hall, Mexico (IFC Project #29753). CAO complaints numbered: 02–06 and 08, April 8, 2015, p. 12; CAO, IFC investment in Plato, Compliance Appraisal: Summary of Results. Kyrgyzstan Project #32583 Complaint 01, July 29, 2015, p. 11.
- 160.
See, e.g., CAO, CAO Investigation of IFC Environmental and Social Performance in Relation to: Amalgamated Plantations Private Limited (APPL), India, September 6, 2016, pp. 64–65; CAO, Compliance Investigation Report. IFC Investment in Bidco Bev. & Det. Kenya (Project #33385) Complaint 01 & 04, October 2, 2018, pp. 31–32.
- 161.
CAO, Complaint from Global Unions on behalf of unions representing employees of Avianca, Investigation of IFC Investment in Avianca S.A., Colombia, CAO Ref: C-I-R9-Y12-F165, April 27, 2015 (CAO, Avianca), p. 16.
- 162.
See ibid., pp. 16–17.
- 163.
CAO, CAO Investigation of IFC/MIGA Social and Environmental Performance in Relation to: Bujagali Energy Ltd and World Power Holdings, Uganda, November 3, 2017, p. 35.
- 164.
See, e.g., CAO, Avianca, pp. 17–19 and 22.
- 165.
CAO, Compliance Investigation. IFC Investment in Bilt Paper B.V. (Project #34602), Malaysia, April 13, 2018, p. 46.
- 166.
For an analysis concerning non-labour related CAO cases see Bradlow and Naudé Fourie (2013), p. 43.
- 167.
CAO, CAO Investigation of IFC/MIGA Social and Environmental Performance in Relation to: Bujagali Energy Ltd and World Power Holdings, Uganda, November 3, 2017, p. 35.
- 168.
See CAO, Avianca, p. 25.
- 169.
See, e.g., CAO, Compliance Monitoring Report. IFC Investment in Bujagali Energy Ltd, Uganda, IFC Projects #24408 and #39102, MIGA Project #6732, CAO Complaints -04, -06, -07 & -08, February 27, 2019, p. 9; CAO, Compliance Monitoring Report, IFC Investment in Amalgamated Plantations Private Limited (APPL), India, Project Numbers 25074 and 34562, January 23, 2019, p. 25.
- 170.
See, e.g., Annex, Cases 5 and 40.
- 171.
See CAO, Avianca, pp. 1–8.
- 172.
See further ITUC (2015) Avianca-Colombia: IFC Should Follow Ombudsman’s Recommendations for Labour Standards Compliance, Say Unions. Press Release of 19 May 2015. Available at: http://www.ituc-csi.org/avianca-colombia-ifc-should-follow?lang=de.
- 173.
See further Arp (2012), pp. 37–38.
- 174.
CAO, Turkey/Standard Profil-01/Duzce. Ombudsman Conclusion Report—Standard Profil, Turkey, June 2012, p. 2. See also Berber Agtas (2009) Promoting Core Labour Standards through the Performance Standards of the IFC: The Case of Turkey, Global Union Research Network Discussion Paper No. 8, ILO, Geneva, pp. 38–89.
- 175.
CAO, CAO Assessment and Dispute Resolution Conclusion Report, Complaint Regarding IFC’s Investment in Egyptian Indian Polyester Company—Sokhna (IFC Project #28878), May 2017, p. 7.
- 176.
CAO, CAO Ombudsman Conclusion Report: Uganda: Bujagali Energy-04/Bujagali, November 2013, p. 3.
- 177.
Ibid.
- 178.
See CAO, Assan Aluminyum Project. Complaint Conclusion Report, August 2010, p. 2; CAO, Ombudsman Assessment & Conclusion Report. Complaint Regarding the Africa Investco Project (Project #27819), September 2012, p. 6.
- 179.
See Annex, Cases 15–18, 21, 39–41.
- 180.
See also Bugalski (2016), pp. 3–4.
- 181.
See, e.g., Davis and Dadush (2010).
- 182.
See for a similar point on the World Bank, Passoni et al. (2016), p. 926.
- 183.
For a critical perspective concerning IFC’s Performance Standards see Cradden et al. (2017).
- 184.
See further Ebert (2018), p. 299, focussing on the World Bank.
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Annex: Table of Cases Filed with the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman
Documentation for all cases is available at: http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/.
Annex: Table of Cases Filed with the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman
-
1.
Cambodia/VEIL II-01/Ratanakiri Province (February 10, 2014)
-
2.
Cameroon/Chad-Cameroon Pipeline-02/Cameroon (May 16, 2011)
-
3.
Cameroon/AES Sonel-02/Doula (February 21, 2013)
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4.
Chile/Alto Maipo-02/Cajon del Maipo (July 05, 2017)
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5.
Colombia/Avianca-01/Colombia (November 14, 2011)
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6.
Egypt/Alex Dev Ltd-01/Wadi al-Qamar (April 09, 2015)
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7.
Egypt/Egyptian Indian Polyester Company—Sokhna-01/India (October 27, 2016)
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8.
Egypt/Alex Dev Ltd-02/Beni Suef (February 13, 2017)
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9.
Egypt/Alex Dev Ltd-03/Beni Suef (May 10, 2017)
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10.
Egypt/Egyptian Indian Polyester Company—Sokhna-02/India (August 20, 2017)
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11.
Georgia/Trans-Anatolian Pipeline-01/Vale (March 29, 2017)
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12.
Ghana/MPS-01/Tema (February 26, 2018)
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13.
Guatemala/Guatemala: TCQ-01/Puerto Quetzal (March 20, 2014)
-
14.
India/SN Power-01/CAO Vice President Request (December 01, 2008)
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15.
India/Tata Tea-01/CAO Vice President Request (May 01, 2012)
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16.
India/Tata Tea-02/Assam (February 02, 2013)
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17.
Kenya/Bidco Bev. & Det.-01/Thika (June 10, 2016)
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18.
Kenya/Bidco Bev. & Det.-04/Thika (May 23, 2017)
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19.
Kenya/Bridge International Academies-01/Kenya (June 15, 2018)
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20.
Kyrgyz Republic/Plato-01/Bishkek (April 07, 2015)
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21.
Malaysia/Bilt Paper-02/Sipitang (June 01, 2015)
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22.
Mauritius/Africa Investco-01 (March 28, 2012)
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23.
Mexico/Harmon Hall-01/Mexico (December 02, 2011)
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24.
Mexico/Harmon Hall-02/Puerto Vallarta (September 06, 2013)
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25.
Mexico/Harmon Hall-03-06/Puerto Vallarta and Merida Campestre (October 14, 2013)
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26.
Mexico/Harmon Hall-07/San Luis Potosi (March 04, 2014)
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27.
Mexico/Harmon Hall-08/Puerto Vallarta (March 14, 2014)
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28.
Nicaragua/Nicaragua Sugar Estates Limited-01/León and Chinandega (March 01, 2008)
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29.
Nigeria/Niger Delta Contractor Revolving Credit Facility-01/Niger Delta (June 01, 2001)
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30.
Nigeria/Eleme Fertilizer-01/Port Harcourt (April 11, 2018)
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31.
Pakistan/Pakistan: Bank Alfalah-01/Saddar Karachi (May 06, 2015)
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32.
Peru/Yanacocha-06/Cajamarca (February 06, 2014)
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33.
Peru/Yanacocha-09/Cajamarca (January 27, 2017)
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34.
Peru/Yanacocha-10/Cajamarca (May 10, 2017)
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35.
Peru/Yanacocha-11/Cajamarca (December 06, 2017)
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36.
South Africa/Lonmin-01/Vice President request (August 21, 2012)
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37.
Togo/Togo LCT-02/Lomé (February 16, 2018)
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38.
Turkey/Standard Profil-01/Duzce (September 01, 2008)
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39.
Turkey/Assan Aluminyum-01/Dilovasi (October 01, 2008)
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40.
Uganda/Bujagali Energy-04/Bujagali (March 21, 2011)
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41.
Uganda/Bujagali Energy-06/Bujagali (April 03, 2013)
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42.
Uganda/Bujagali Energy-08/Bujagali (June 06, 2017)
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43.
Ukraine/MHP-01/Vinnytsia (June 05, 2018)
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Ebert, F.C. (2019). Labour Safeguards of International Financial Institutions: Can They Help to Avoid Violations of ILO Core Labour Standards?. In: Bungenberg, M., Krajewski, M., Tams, C.J., Terhechte, J.P., Ziegler, A.R. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2019. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 10. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2019_45
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