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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2018 pp 113–142Cite as

Beyond Antagonism: Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in the Natural Resources Sector

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Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 9))

Abstract

The essay examines the legal protection of foreign investment in the natural resources sector, keeping in mind the pivotal role the sector may play in the economic development of the host State as well as the need to strike a balance between the private and public interests at stake. After elaborating on the notions of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and sustainable development, it discusses the main questions related to the exercise of regulatory powers by the host State, the protection of social values, and the promotion of good governance. It finally attempts to identify the sources of tension and possibly conflict with a view of reconciling the competing rights and interests of stakeholders.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On the settlement of disputes concerning investment in the natural resources sector, see Ortino and Tabari (2016), p. 496.

  2. 2.

    OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1740.

  3. 3.

    WTO (2010), p. 46. For a full discussion on the definition, see Rutten and Mwangi (2014), p. 51.

  4. 4.

    See Namibia (South West Africa), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16, para 53. In United States - Import Prohibition of certain Shrimps and Shrimps Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 December 1998, para 130, the WTO Appellate Body, pointed out that the generic term ‘natural resources’ in Article XX (g) GATT 1996 is “by definition, evolutionary”. As noted by Higgins R, Declaration appended to Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, 13 December 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 1045, para 2, a generic term is a “known legal term, whose content the parties expected would change through time”.

  5. 5.

    Case Concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, 13 July 2009, para 66. In para 70, the Court further pointed out that generic terms “must be understood to have the meaning they bear on each occasion on which the Treaty is to be applied, and not necessarily their original meaning”. In Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece/Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 3 at p. 32, para 77, the Court held that where a term can be classified as generic “[t]he presumption arises that its meaning was intended to follow the evolution of the law and to correspond with the meaning attached to the expression by the law in force at any given time”.

  6. 6.

    Concluded on 17 December 1994 and entered into force on 16 April 1998, at https://energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf.

  7. 7.

    Concluded on 31 January 2003. Article 40 provides for the provisional application of the treaty pending its entry into force, at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5477.

  8. 8.

    See, for instance, the preamble of the BIT between Finland—Montenegro, in which the parties agreed that a stable framework for investment will contribute to maximising the effective utilisation of economic resources. The preamble of the model BIT elaborated and subsequently abandoned by Norway recorded the desire of the contracting parties “to maximize effective and sustainable utilization of economic resources.”

  9. 9.

    See, for instance, SADC Model BIT Article 2.II.7.

  10. 10.

    See, for instance, Article XVII of the BIT between Canada and Egypt BIT (1996), or Article 3 c. (iii) of the BIT between the United States and Uruguay.

  11. 11.

    See, for instance, Article 16.1 (v) of the Indian Model BIT.

  12. 12.

    Ley Orgánica Para el Aprovechamiento Sostenible de los Recursos Naturales, 25 June 1997, at http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/94F1B8549C309A4005257B830064833E/$FILE/26821.pdf.

  13. 13.

    Resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962.

  14. 14.

    Resolution 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1 May 1974.

  15. 15.

    Resolution 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 12 December 1974.

  16. 16.

    Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168, para 244. That PSNR does not apply—as held by the Court—in the context of an international armed conflict remains questionable.

  17. 17.

    Schrijver (1997); Hobe (2015), p. 1; Schrijver (2015), p. 15, esp. pp. 24–26; Tyagi (2015) p. 588.

  18. 18.

    Jennings and Watts (1992), p. 384.

  19. 19.

    Idem., p. 125; likewise Malanczuk (1997), p. 17, notes that “[t]he theory of sovereignty began as an attempt to analyse the internal structure of a State. Political philosophers though that there must be, within each State, some entity which possessed supreme legislative power and/or supreme political power”.

  20. 20.

    Sornarajah (2010), p. 83.

  21. 21.

    Resolution 626 (VII), 21 December 1952. In China – Rare Earths, WT/DS331R, WT/DS332R and WT/DS433R, 22 March 2014, para 7.270, the Panel described PSNR as “a corollary of statehood”.

  22. 22.

    In Crystallex International Corporation v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, 16 April 2016, para 674, the Tribunal held that foreign investors have no “right” to a permit under international law, because “a state would always maintain its freedom to deny a permit if it so decides”.

  23. 23.

    Judge ad hoc Kateca, dissenting opinion in Congo v. Uganda, above note 16, p. 378.

  24. 24.

    Subedi (2016), p. 38.

  25. 25.

    In this regard, it is worth noting that the preamble of the recent legislation on natural resources, proclaimed that Tanzania “being a sovereign state has permanent sovereignty over all natural wealth” (emphasis added), Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017, 28 June 2017, at https://www.madini.go.tz/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Natural-Wealth-and-Resources-Permanent-Sovereignty-Act-2017.pdf.

  26. 26.

    In this regard, Article 18.1 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Energy reads: “The Contracting Parties recognize state sovereignty and sovereign rights over energy resources. They reaffirm that these must be exercised in accordance with and subject to the rules of international law”.

  27. 27.

    Note 15. As maintained by Bernie et al. (2009), p. 191, the resolutions “[w]ere primarily directed at asserting the right to nazionalize or control foreign-owned resources and industries, free from some of the older rules which protected foreign investments”.

  28. 28.

    Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. Libya, Award, 19 January 1977, 17 ILM 1978 1, para 88.

  29. 29.

    See, for instance, General Assembly resolution 1515 (XV), 15 December 1960.

  30. 30.

    Resolution 1803, note 13.

  31. 31.

    Ibidem.

  32. 32.

    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, signed on 16 December 1966 and entered into force, respectively, on 23 March 1976 and 3 January 1976.

  33. 33.

    Wälde (1998), p. 771.

  34. 34.

    As pointed out by Brownlie (1979), p. 263, “it is difficult to decide to what extent, if at all, the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order of 1974 evidences any specific development in customary international law. Probably it does not, since the right to nationalize was not denied in the existing law and it was the conditions under which nationalization occurred which were the object of persistent debate”.

  35. 35.

    McDougal (1955), p. 354.

  36. 36.

    See, for instance, Article 5 (1) of the BIT between Egypt and Vietnam.

  37. 37.

    It is however, worthwhile noting that some States have brought expropriation back to the realm of domestic law as most prominently South Africa. The South African Protection of Investment Act (2015), at https://www.thedti.gov.za/gazzettes/39514.pdf, in particular, has pegged the protection of property to Article 25 of the Constitution. Such developments, nonetheless, do not affect the obligations of South Africa under the relevant investment treaties and customary international law.

  38. 38.

    Bernie et al. (2009), p. 54. Alternatively, sustainable development can be seen as a matrix, see Barrel (2016), p. 3, at 4.

  39. 39.

    Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7 para 141.

  40. 40.

    Lowe (1999), p. 30.

  41. 41.

    Idem, pp. 31–34.

  42. 42.

    Sands (1995), p. 53.

  43. 43.

    Final Report, Sofia Conference (2012), para 36.

  44. 44.

    New Delhi Declaration on the Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development (2002), at www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/25.

  45. 45.

    As synthesized by Sands (2012), p. 9.

  46. 46.

    BIT between Morocco and Nigeria (not yet in force). In the same vein, the preamble of the COMESA Investment Agreement (not yet in force), recognises that ‘direct investment is an important source of finance for sustaining the pace of economic, industrial, infrastructure and technology development; hence, the need to attract higher and sustainable level of direct investment flows in COMESA’.

  47. 47.

    Likewise, Article 2 (d) (i) of the Namibian Investment Law (2016) aims at promoting sustainable economic development and growth through the mobilization and attraction of domestic and foreign investments that inter alia enhance “the economic development objectives of Namibia to build a prosperous, industrialised society with adequate direct investment to, among other things, encourage the creation of employment, wealth, technology transfer, capacity building, value addition to natural resources and foreign currency generation”.

  48. 48.

    The three main pieces of legislation were adopted on 28 June 2017: (a) Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereign) Act; (b) Natural Wealth and Resources Contract (Review and Re-Negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act; and (c) Written Law (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act, all available at http://www.tcme.or.tz/resources/category/acts-and-regulations/P8.

  49. 49.

    Interestingly, Section 12 of the Liberian Investment act (2010) expressly excludes any retroactive effects, at http://www.moci.gov.lr/doc/TheInvestmentActof2010(1).pdf

  50. 50.

    It has been reported that several foreign investors in the natural resources sector (including Acacia Mining, AngloGold Ashanti and OreCorp) have started arbitral proceedings against Tanzania after the adoption of the legislation.

  51. 51.

    Unless otherwise bound by treaties, legislation or contractual obligations, States remain free to regulate the admission and establishment of foreign investment within their jurisdictions as a sovereign prerogative, see Sacerdoti (2000), p. 105; Gómez-Palacio and Muchlinski (2008), p. 227. See also UNCTAD, Admission and Establishment (UNCTAD, New York, Geneva, 2002), p. 11.

  52. 52.

    Note 15.

  53. 53.

    Note 11.

  54. 54.

    ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Hungary, ICSID ARB/03/16, Award, 2 October 2006, para 423. TecnicasMedioambientalesTecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003, para 119, “[t]he principle that the State’s exercise of its sovereign powers within the framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to its powers as administrator without entitling them to any compensation whatsoever is undisputable”.

  55. 55.

    Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September 2007, para 332.

  56. 56.

    Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, para 33.

  57. 57.

    Article 2.1, General Assembly Resolution 3281, note 15.

  58. 58.

    Respectively notes 13 and 15.

  59. 59.

    Berman F, diss. op. in Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. Peru, ICSID ARB/03/4, Annulment, 13 August 2007, para 9.

  60. 60.

    Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentina, ICSID ARB/01/3, Award, 22 May 2007, para 337, the Tribunal pointed out that “States are of course free to amend the Treaty by consenting to another text, but this would not affect rights acquired under the Treaty by investors or other beneficiaries”.

  61. 61.

    See, for instance, Shemberg A, “Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights,” May 27, 2009, at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/9feb5b00488555eab8c4fa6a6515bb18/Stabilization%2BPaper.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. See also Sheppard and Crockett (2010), p. 333.

  62. 62.

    See Human Rights Council, “Principles for responsible contracts,” May 25, 2011, A/HRC/17/31/Add.3.

  63. 63.

    See Reich A, Israel’s Foreign Investment Protection Regime in View of Developments in its Energy Sector, European University Institute Working Paper LAW 2017/02, at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/45005/LAW_2017_02.pdf?sequence=1.

  64. 64.

    Identical or similar clauses are contained in Italy’s BITs with Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Cameroon, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Tanzania, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.

  65. 65.

    According to UNECA (2015), p. 9, “foreign investment is heavily protected, with little or no responsibilities and obligations towards the host economy and the people, particularly in terms of protecting land, social, cultural, and environmental rights. This form of neglect, or contempt, creates a challenging environment for policymakers whose job is to address food security concerns and safeguard land and human rights”, http://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/23035.

  66. 66.

    See, for instance, Metalclad v. Mexico, ICSID ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 30 August 2000, para 103. In literature, see in particular: Christie (1962), p. 307; Dolzer (2003), p. 64; Reisman and Sloane (2004), p. 115; Fortier and Drymer (2004), p. 293; Newcombe (2005), p. 1; OECD (2005); Hoffmann (2008), p. 151; Montt (2009), pp. 231 ff.

  67. 67.

    As noted by the Tribunal in Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, 3 September 2004, para 200, “[t]he concept of indirect (or ‘de facto’, or ‘creeping’) expropriation is not clearly defined. Indirect expropriation or nationalization is a measure that does not involve an overt taking, but that effectively neutralized the enjoyment of the property”. In Saluka v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para 263, the Tribunal conceded that “[i]nternational law has yet to draw a bright and easily distinguishable line between non-compensable regulations on the one hand and, on the other, measures that have the effect of depriving foreign investors of their investment and are thus unlawful and compensable in international law”.

  68. 68.

    See the survey conducted in K. Gordon, J. Pohl, Environmental Concerns in International Investment Agreements. A Survey, OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2011/01, at https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2011_1.pdf.

  69. 69.

    See Vinuales (2009), p. 244.

  70. 70.

    See, for instance, Vinuales (2015), p. 1517. For two recent cases, see W.R. Clayton, W.R. Clayton, D. Clayton, D. Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 17 March 2015 (with dissenting opinion of McRae); Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. El Salvador, ICSID ARB/09/12, Award, 14 October 2016.

  71. 71.

    See also the preamble of the ECT, in which contracting Parties recognized “the necessity for the most efficient exploration, production, conversion, storage, transport, distribution and use of energy”.

  72. 72.

    See, for instance, Article VII (1) of the BIT concluded in 2009 between Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union and Colombia.

  73. 73.

    Article 19.1 of the ECOWAS Energy Protocol reads: “Each Contracting Party shall strive to minimize in an economically efficient manner harmful Environmental Impacts […] taking proper account of safety. In doing so, each Contracting Party shall act in a Cost-Effective manner. In its policies and actions, each Contracting Party shall strive to take precautionary measures to prevent or minimize environmental degradation. The Contracting Parties agree that the polluter in the Areas of Contracting Parties, shall bear the cost of the avoidance, elimination, and clean-up of any pollution, as well as the cost of any other consequences of such pollution, including trans-boundary pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting Investment in the Energy Cycle or international trade”.

  74. 74.

    European Commission, Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) in support of an Investment Agreement between the European Union and the People’s Republic of China, Interim Report (June 2017), at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/june/tradoc_155638.pdf.

  75. 75.

    See, for instance, Article VII (4) of the BIT between the Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union and Colombia.

  76. 76.

    Under Article 10 (1) of the Canadian Model BIT, for instance, “nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing measures necessary inter alia for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources” (emphasis added).

  77. 77.

    According to Article 16.1 of the Indian Model BIT, for instance, “nothing in this Treaty precludes the Host State from taking actions or measures of general applicability which it considers necessary with respect inter alia to protecting and conserving the environment including all living and non-living natural resources” (emphasis added).

  78. 78.

    See, for instance, the 2012 US Model BIT.

  79. 79.

    For another examples, see Article 6 of the Indonesian Law Concerning Investment (2007); Section 17 of the Myanmar’s Foreign Investment Law (2012); Article 7 of the Mongolian Law On Investment (2013); Article 56 of Gambia’s Investment and Export Promotion Agency Act (2010).

  80. 80.

    Article 1(vi), Convention on EIA in a Transboundary Context (1991), at www.unece.org/env/eia/about/eia_text.html. In literature, see Gehring (2011), p. 149; Collins (2010), p. 4; VanDuzer et al. (2013); Mayeda (2017), p. 131. In Emilio AgustínMaffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, 13 November 2000, para. 67, the Tribunal pointed out that the “[e]nvironmental Impact Assessment procedure is basic for the adequate protection of the environment and the application of appropriate preventive measures. This is true, not only under Spanish and EEC law, but also increasingly so under international law.”

  81. 81.

    Article 2(6), UNECE Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (2003), at www.unece.org/env/eia/about/sea_text.html.

  82. 82.

    Article 12.1 reads: “[i]nvestors and investments shall conduct an environmental and social impact assessment of the potential investment.”

  83. 83.

    The large majority of States have adopted domestic legislation imposing Environmental Impact Assessments. See, for instance, World Bank, Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations and Strategic Environmental Assessment Requirements. Practices and Lessons Learned in East and Southeast Asia, 2006, at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/EIA&SEA-regional-review.pdf.

  84. 84.

    See OECD Global Forum on International Investment, Environmental Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment in the Mining Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, at https://www.oecd.org/env/1819582.pdf.

  85. 85.

    For two recent examples, see Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Oman, ICSID ARB/11/33, Award, 3 November 2015 and Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID ARB/09/12, Award, 14 October 2016.

  86. 86.

    Ley de Promoción y Garantía de Inversiones (1997), at http://www.investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/InvestmentLaw/law/58. For another example, see Australia National Environment Protection (Assessment of Site Contamination) Measures (1999), http://www.nepc.gov.au/nepms/assessment-site-contamination.

  87. 87.

    See Cotula (2012); Yilmaz-Vastardis and Van Ho (2015), p. 223; Francioni (2016), p. 66. In general, see, amongst many: Weiler (2004), p. 429; Puvimanasinghe (2007); Dupuy et al. (2009); De Schutter (2009), p. 137; Hirsch (2013), p. 85.

  88. 88.

    Alvarez (1996–1997), p. 308, has described NAFTA’s investment chapter as a human rights treaty for a special interest group.

  89. 89.

    The UK House of Commons, Trade and Industry Committee, 3rd Report, 1998–1999, para 52, at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmtrdind/112/11201.htm, considered the superficial treatment reserved to environmental, social and human rights issues as one of the main reasons for the failure to conclude a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, under the auspices of the OECD.

  90. 90.

    In the preamble of the BIT between Austria and Kosovo, for instance, the contracting parties referred to the international obligations and commitments concerning the respect for human rights.

  91. 91.

    Cotula L, Rethinking Investment Treaties to Advance Human Rights, IIED Briefing, September 2016, at http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17376IIED.pdf. See also Mann H, International Investment Agreements, Business and Human Rights: Key Issues and Opportunities, OECD Global Forum, 27–28 March 2008, at http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40311282.pdf; Jacob M, International Investment Agreements and Human Rights, INEF Research Paper Series Human Rights, 03/2010, at http://www.humanrights-business.org/files/international_investment_agreements_and_human_rights.pdf; Dupuy et al. (2009), p. 45.

  92. 92.

    Writing in Weiler (2004), p. 429, has proposed some draft articles that could be inserted in investment treaties in order to recognize and make enforceable the investment-related human rights of nationals of the host State. In line with the scope of application of most human rights treaties, it may be argued that these remedies should not be confined to nationals of the host State but should be generally available to those within its jurisdiction. At any rate, these remedies could be subjected to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. Contracting parties could also include a fork-in-the-road provision on the remedies offered under the investment treaty and under human rights treaties.

  93. 93.

    See in general Jacur et al. (2015); see also above note 80.

  94. 94.

    Cotula (2016), p. 139.

  95. 95.

    At http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf.

  96. 96.

    At https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/guiding_principles_eng_rev_era_size.pdf.

  97. 97.

    See, for instance, the South African Protection of Investment Act (2015), note 37.

  98. 98.

    See, in particular, Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and others v. Zimbabwe, ICSID ARB/05/6, Award, 22 April 2009.

  99. 99.

    See, for instance, Indian Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (2013), at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/96426/113950/F1682977291/IND96426.pdf.

  100. 100.

    See, for instance, the South African Protection of Investment Act, note 37.

  101. 101.

    See Lenzerini (2014), p. 192.

  102. 102.

    ILO Convention 1969 adopted on 27 June 1989, entered into force on 5 September 1991, at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169. It is part of the domestic legal system of, and is directly applicable in, almost all the countries that have ratified it. In many of these countries, and especially in South America, the convention enjoys a higher rank than ordinary legislation or even constitutional status. See also ILO, Application of Convention No. 169 by Domestic and International courts in Latin America – A Casebook, November 2009, at http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Resources/Publications/WCMS_123946/lang%2D%2Den/index.htm. See also the 2004 AkwéKon Voluntary Guidelines, at https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/akwe-brochure-en.pdf. At the domestic level, see the Indigenous Investment Principles adopted by Indigenous Business Australia (IBA), at http://www.iba.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/IB7158_IPP-brochure_FA4.pdf.

  103. 103.

    Respondent’s Counter Memorial on the Merits, 22 December 2008, p. 139. See also Article 1128 Submission, 22 December 2008, pp. 2–4.

  104. 104.

    See Muchlinski (2007), pp. 660 ff.

  105. 105.

    See UN Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 16 June 2011, at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. In literature, see, in particular, Deva and Bilchitz (2013).

  106. 106.

    At http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/guidelines. In literature, see, in particular, Ruggie J, Nelson T, Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Normative Innovation and Implementation Challenges, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper 66, May 2015, at https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/programs/cri/files/workingpaper.66.oecd.pdf.

  107. 107.

    UK Government, Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, at www.bis.gov.uk/policies/business-sectors/green-economy/sustainable-development/corporate-responsibility. The European Commission, COM(2001)366, 18 July 2001, at eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0366en01.pdf, has considered Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.” The Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs has defined CSR as “the voluntary contribution of business to sustainable development which takes into consideration the interests of stakeholders. It encompasses the three dimensions of sustainable development; the economy, the environment and society”, at www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00645/04008/index.html?lang=en. In literature see in particular, Bantekas (2004), p. 309; McCorquodale and Simons (2007), p. 598; De Schutter (2009), p. 137; Muchlinski (2011), p. 30.

  108. 108.

    Brief of J. Stieglitz as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, p. 24, at https://harvardhumanrights.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/brief-of-joseph-e-stiglitz.pdf. For a comment of the decision, see Boschiero (2014), p. 3.

  109. 109.

    See, for instance, Article 14 of the BIT between Canada and Mongolia.

  110. 110.

    See, for instance, Article 16 of ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Investment.

  111. 111.

    Article 810, at www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CAN_PER/CAN_PER_e/CAN_PER_text_e.asp#Cha08Art01. For a provision specifically on anti-corruption see Article 13 the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.

  112. 112.

    Note 46.

  113. 113.

    OECD, DAC Orientation on Participatory Development and Good Governance, OCDE/GD (93)191, 1993, at www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=OCDE/GD(93)191&docLanguage=En.

  114. 114.

    Note 44.

  115. 115.

    UN Secretary General Report, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para 8.

  116. 116.

    At http://www.petrocom.gov.gh/assets/petroluem-revenue-management-act815-2011-.pdf. In literature, see Amoako Tuffour and Ghannay (2016), p. 35.

  117. 117.

    At https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/the_eiti_standard_2016_-_english_0.pdf. In literature, see Wilson and Van Alstine (2017), p. 50.

  118. 118.

    At http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/neitiact.pdf.

  119. 119.

    At http://www.leiti.org.lr/uploads/2/1/5/6/21569928/act.pdf.

  120. 120.

    At http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/InvestmentLaws/laws/45.

  121. 121.

    At http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf, 43 Parties. See also the 2009 OECD Recommendation, at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44176910.pdf.

  122. 122.

    At http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf, 183 Parties.

  123. 123.

    Weiss and Scherzer (2015), p. 56.

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  1. School of Law, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK

    Tarcisio Gazzini

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  1. Faculty of Law, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Marc Bungenberg

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

  3. School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Christian J. Tams

  4. Competition and Regulation Institute, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany

    Jörg Philipp Terhechte

  5. Faculty of Law and Criminal Sciences, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Andreas R. Ziegler

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Gazzini, T. (2018). Beyond Antagonism: Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in the Natural Resources Sector. In: Bungenberg, M., Krajewski, M., Tams, C.J., Terhechte, J.P., Ziegler, A.R. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2018. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2018_6

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