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On extensive form implementation of equilibria in differential information economies

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Advances in Mathematical Economics

Part of the book series: Advances in Mathematical Economics ((MATHECON,volume 8))

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Abstract

We investigate the possibility of a dynamic explanation of the equilibrium ideas in terms of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) (or sequential equilibrium). In particular, we take an equilibrium outcome which has been found by means of a static optimizing behavior and ask the following question. Can this outcome be supported, (or implemented), as a PBE of an extensive form game of a reasonable form? We provide a positive answer for solution concepts which are incentive compatible and a negative one for those which are not.

We are very grateful to A. Hadjiprocopis for his invaluable help and suggestions.

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Glycopantis, D., Muir, A., Yannelis, N.C. (2006). On extensive form implementation of equilibria in differential information economies. In: Kusuoka, S., Yamazaki, A. (eds) Advances in Mathematical Economics. Advances in Mathematical Economics, vol 8. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/4-431-30899-7_7

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