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Solution-based congestion games

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Advances in Mathematical Economics

Part of the book series: Advances in Mathematical Economics ((MATHECON,volume 8))

Abstract

In this paper we develop the theory of potential of cooperative games for semivalues, characterize congestion models that are defined by semivalues, and suggest an application of these results to combinatorial auctions, which may explain the success of the Iowa electronic market.

This work was partially supported by the Fund of the Israeli Science Foundation, and by the Fund for the Promotion of Research at the Technion.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel

    Dov Monderer

Authors
  1. Dov Monderer
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Tokyo, 3-8-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, 153-0041, Japan

    Shigeo Kusuoka (Professor) (Professor)

  2. Graduate Faculty of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8601, Japan

    Akira Yamazaki (Professor) (Professor)

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag

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Monderer, D. (2006). Solution-based congestion games. In: Kusuoka, S., Yamazaki, A. (eds) Advances in Mathematical Economics. Advances in Mathematical Economics, vol 8. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/4-431-30899-7_16

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