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Implementation with unknown endowments in a two-trader pure exchange economy

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Advances in Mathematical Economics

Part of the book series: Advances in Mathematical Economics ((MATHECON,volume 8))

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References

  1. Dutta, B., Sen, A.: A necessary and sufficient condition for two-person Nash implementation. Review of Economic Studies 58, 121–128 (1991)

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  3. Hurwicz, L.: Balanced outcome functions yielding Walrasian and Lindahl allocations at Nash equilibrium points for two or more agents. In: General Equilibrium, Growth, and Trade, Essays in Honor of Lionel McKenzie (J.R. Green, J.A. Scheinkman eds.). pp. 125–137 Academic Press, New York 1979

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  4. Hurwicz, L.: Feasible balanced outcome functions yielding Walrasian and Lindahl allocations at Nash equilibrium points in economies with two agents when the designer knows the feasible set. mimeo, presented at the 1997 Penn State NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference (1996)

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Minnesota, USA

    Leonid Hurwicz

Authors
  1. Leonid Hurwicz
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Tokyo, 3-8-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, 153-0041, Japan

    Shigeo Kusuoka (Professor) (Professor)

  2. Graduate Faculty of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8601, Japan

    Akira Yamazaki (Professor) (Professor)

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag

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Hurwicz, L. (2006). Implementation with unknown endowments in a two-trader pure exchange economy. In: Kusuoka, S., Yamazaki, A. (eds) Advances in Mathematical Economics. Advances in Mathematical Economics, vol 8. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/4-431-30899-7_10

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