Concluding Remarks
The flat and parallel type has the least constraints on access structure, and we had confidently expected it to show an effective performance; however, the simulation results surprisingly showed that over the five case settings it attained only a middle ranking.
It would seem that simulation performance depends on the fitness between the access structure and the given flow pattern conditions, such as problem arrivals and citizen participation, so the flat and parallel type, with shortcuts between local committees and specialized committees giving greater flexibility to cope with differing kinds of flow conditions, will not necessarily be highlighted under a variety of specific conditions and simulation settings.
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Kaneda, T., Hattori, Y. (2005). Simulation Analysis Using the Garbage Can Model for Designing a Citizen Participation System for Comprehensive Municipal Planning. In: Arai, K., Deguchi, H., Matsui, H. (eds) Agent-Based Modeling Meets Gaming Simulation. Agent-Based Social Systems, vol 2. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/4-431-29427-9_5
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