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Negotiations in network markets

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Negotiations with Asymmetrical Distribution of Power

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  242. See Die Bahn, 2004, pp. 20 ff.; Die Bahn, 2005b, p. 39. The incumbent DB is obviously against such an approach and voices its opposition loudly.

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  245. See Ewers/ Ilgmann, 2001a, p. 6. They look at the pricing system of Deutsche Bahn, which discriminates between the competitors: not so much on pricing issues but on quality aspects. These are the issues that are hard to prove and can be extremely disturbing as they cause cost in terms of time and legal expenses.

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(2006). Negotiations in network markets. In: Negotiations with Asymmetrical Distribution of Power. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-7908-1744-9_3

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