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Behavioral Frictions in Online Contracting: Evidence from Yankee Auctions

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The Economics of Online Markets and ICT Networks

Part of the book series: Contributions to Economics ((CE))

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Cambridge, 640 King’s College, Cambridge, CB2 1ST, UK

    Mira Slavova (Judge Business School)

Authors
  1. Mira Slavova
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. UWS City Research Centre Level 8, AEGIS, 263 Clarence Street, Sydney, NSW, 2000, Australia

    Russel Cooper

  2. School of Economics and Finance, Curtin Business School, 1 Kent Street, Bentley, WA, 6102, Australia

    Gary Madden (Director, CEEM) & Michael Schipp (Director, CEEM) & 

  3. School of Inforamtion Systems, Curtin Business School, 1 Kent Street, Bentley, WA, 6102, Australia

    Ashley Lloyd (Optus Chair in e-Business) (Optus Chair in e-Business)

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© 2006 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg

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Slavova, M. (2006). Behavioral Frictions in Online Contracting: Evidence from Yankee Auctions. In: Cooper, R., Madden, G., Lloyd, A., Schipp, M. (eds) The Economics of Online Markets and ICT Networks. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-7908-1707-4_4

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