Abstract
Bakhtiari et al recently proposed a fast message authentication primitive called KHF. This paper shows that KHF is highly vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis: it can be broken with about 37 chosen message queries. This suggests that the KHF design should be reconsidered.
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References
S. Bakhtiari, R. Safavi-Naini, and J. Pieprzyk, “Keyed hash functions,” Cryptography: Policy and Algorithms, E. Dawson and Jovan Golic (Eds), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1029, Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp.201–214.
E. Biham and A. Shamir, Differential Cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard, Springer-Verlag, 1993.
B. Preneel, P.C. van Oorschot, “MDx-MAC and building fast MACs from hash functions,” Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO’ 95, Springer-Verlag, 1995, pp. 1–14.
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© 1998 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Wagner, D. (1998). Differential Cryptanalysis of KHF. In: Vaudenay, S. (eds) Fast Software Encryption. FSE 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1372. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-69710-1_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-69710-1_20
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