The uses and limits of financial cryptography: A law professor's perspective

  • Peter P. Swire
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1318)


There is considerable support in the cryptography community for the “Cypherpunk Credo,” defined as: “Privacy through technology, not legislation.“ Much discussion to date has assumed that the U.S. government's opposition to strong cryptography, such as its key escrow proposals, is the primary obstacle to widespread use of anonymous electronic cash. For purposes of this paper, I assume that strong cryptography is legal and readily available. Even in that event, I claim that strong cryptography will be used to preserve anonymity only in a highly restricted subset of financial transactions. Furthermore, because technology often will not assure privacy, legal rules can and should play an important supplementary role in the protection of privacy in financial transactions.


Credit Card Legal Rule Financial Transaction Default Rule Debit Card 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter P. Swire
    • 1
  1. 1.College of LawOhio State UniversityColumbusUSA

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