Unlinkable serial transactions

  • Paul F. Syverson
  • Stuart G. Stubblebine
  • David M. Goldschlag
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1318)


We present a protocol for unlinkable serial transactions suitable for a variety of network-based subscription services. The protocol prevents the service from tracking the behavior of its customers while protecting the service vendor from abuse due to simultaneous or “cloned” usage from a single subscription. We present variants of the protocol supporting pay-per-use transactions within a subscription. We describe other applications including third-party subscription management, multivendor package sales, proof of group membership, and voter registration.


Voter Registration Initial Certificate Subscription Service Anonymous Communication Acknowledgement Message 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul F. Syverson
    • 1
  • Stuart G. Stubblebine
    • 2
  • David M. Goldschlag
    • 1
  1. 1.Code 5543, Naval Research LaboratoryCenter for High Assurance Computer SystemsWashington DCUSA
  2. 2.AT&T Labs-ResearchMurray HillUSA

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