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Australian Workshop on Distributed Artificial Intelligence

DAI 1995: Distributed Artificial Intelligence Architecture and Modelling pp 31–45Cite as

A kernel-oriented model for autonomous-agent coalition-formation in general environments

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 1087))

Abstract

An important way for autonomous agents to execute tasks and to maximize payoff is to share resources and cooperate on task execution by creating coalitions of agents. Among individual rational agents, such coalitions will form if, and only if, each member of a coalition gains more if it joins the coalition than it could gain previously. There are several models of creating such coalitions and dividing the joint payoff among the members. In this paper we present a model for coalition formation and payoff distribution in general environments. We focus on a reduced complexity kernel-oriented coalition formation model. The model is partitioned into two levels — a social level and a strategic level. This partition enables one to distinguish between regulations that must be agreed upon and are forced by the designers of the agents, and strategies by which each agent acts and that can be adopted at will.

This material is based upon work supported in part by the NSF, grant No. IRI-9423967 and the Israeli Ministry of Science, grant No. 6288. We thank S. Aloni and M. Goren for their major contribution to the implementation of the model.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Bar Ilan University Ramat Gan, 52900, Israel

    Onn Shehory & Sarit Kraus

Authors
  1. Onn Shehory
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  2. Sarit Kraus
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Editor information

Chengqi Zhang Dickson Lukose

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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Shehory, O., Kraus, S. (1996). A kernel-oriented model for autonomous-agent coalition-formation in general environments. In: Zhang, C., Lukose, D. (eds) Distributed Artificial Intelligence Architecture and Modelling. DAI 1995. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1087. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61314-5_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61314-5_19

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61314-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68456-5

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