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Prepaid electronic cheques using public-key certificates

  • Cristian Radu
  • René Govaerts
  • Joos Vandewalle
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1025)

Abstract

An electronic payment system which emulates the payments relying on classical cheques is presented. Its main features are a high computational efficiency and low storage requirements for the tamper resistant smart card implementing the purse of the user. This is achieved using a counter-based solution in combination with public-key certificates that represent the electronic cheques. To simplify both the withdrawal and the deposit stage we renounce to provide the untraceability feature. Our payment system is built around the Guillou-Quisquater identification/signature scheme in an RSA-group.

Keywords

Smart Card Signature Scheme Payment System Replay Attack Blind Signature Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Cristian Radu
    • 1
  • René Govaerts
    • 1
  • Joos Vandewalle
    • 1
  1. 1.Laboratorium ESATKatholieke Universiteit LeuvenHeverleeBelgium

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