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Where do intentions come from ?: A framework for goals and intentions adoption, derivation and evolution

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 990))

Abstract

Current agent models usually address the definition of agents' intentions and their relationship to other components of the mental state of an agent. However, the genesis of goals and intentions, and the question of why the agent decides to commit itself or to abandon a particular goal, are questions that have not yet been clearly answered. Moreover, when we look for foundations on which to base implementations of agencies, we get in real trouble because the existence of such a gap in formal models of agents do not allow them to guide crucial aspects of agents' programming. Also, a formal model of agents should take into account their limited reasoning capability in order to lead up to realistic agents. In this paper, we defend a model of goals and intentions, based on deductive structures, and an integrated framework for revising them, that can and has been adopted as a specification for designing and building up artificial agents. The model of goals and intentions is part of the formalization of a complete multi-agent model whose development has guided the parallel development of a workbench, which in turn provided guidance for the refinement and extension of the conceptual model. We argue that research for theoretical foundations of multiagent systems should provide such a guidance.

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Carlos Pinto-Ferreira Nuno J. Mamede

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© 1995 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Gaspar, G., Coelho, H. (1995). Where do intentions come from ?: A framework for goals and intentions adoption, derivation and evolution. In: Pinto-Ferreira, C., Mamede, N.J. (eds) Progress in Artificial Intelligence. EPIA 1995. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 990. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-60428-6_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-60428-6_10

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-60428-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45595-0

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