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What is a skeptical proof?

  • Nonmonotony
  • Conference paper
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KI-95: Advances in Artificial Intelligence (KI 1995)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 981))

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Abstract

We investigate the task of skeptically reasoning in extension-based, nonmonotonic logics by concentrating on general argumentation theories. The restricted applicability of Dung's notion of skeptical provability in his well-known argumentation framework is illustrated, and a new approach based on the notion of a claim associated with each argument is proposed. We provide a formal definition of a skeptical proof in our framework. As a concrete formalism, default logic in case of normal default theories is embedded in the general framework. We prove a formal correspondence between the two notions of skeptical provability, which enables us to adopt the general concept of a skeptical proof into default logic.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. FG Intellektik, FB Informatik, Technische Hochschule Darmstadt, Alexanderstraße 10, D-64283, Darmstadt, Germany

    Michael Thielscher

Authors
  1. Michael Thielscher
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Ipke Wachsmuth Claus-Rainer Rollinger Wilfried Brauer

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© 1995 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Thielscher, M. (1995). What is a skeptical proof?. In: Wachsmuth, I., Rollinger, CR., Brauer, W. (eds) KI-95: Advances in Artificial Intelligence. KI 1995. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 981. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-60343-3_34

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-60343-3_34

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-60343-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-44944-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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