Abstract
There is a fundamental difference between a conditional obligation being violated by a fact, and a conditional obligation being overridden by another conditional obligation. In this paper we analyze this difference in the multi preference semantics of our defeasible deontic logic DefDiode. The semantics contains one preference relation for ideality, which can be used to formalize deontic paradoxes like the Chisholm and Forrester paradoxes, and another preference relation for normality, which can be used to formalize exceptions. The interference of the two preference orderings generates new questions about preferential semantics.
This research was partially supported by the Esprit III Basic Research Project No.6156 Drums II and the Esprit III Basic Research Working Group No.8319 Modelage.
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Tan, YH., der Torre, L.W.N. (1995). Why defeasible deontic logic needs a multi preference semantics. In: Froidevaux, C., Kohlas, J. (eds) Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning and Uncertainty. ECSQARU 1995. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 946. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-60112-0_47
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-60112-0_47
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