Abstract
Belief revision has recently been modelled with the help of the notion of epistemic entrenchment (Gärdenfors and Makinson, TARK 1988, and Rott, JoLLI 1992). This paper offers a systematic justification of the postulates for entrenchment by interpreting entrenchment in terms of the general theory of rational choice. A translation is specified from conditions for entrenchment into conditions for choice, and vice versa. The relative strengths of the postulates are studied, and connections with related work are discussed.
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Rott, H. (1994). Coherent choice and epistemic entrenchment (preliminary report). In: Nebel, B., Dreschler-Fischer, L. (eds) KI-94: Advances in Artificial Intelligence. KI 1994. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 861. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58467-6_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58467-6_25
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