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Providing tractable security analyses in HOL

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 859))

Abstract

This paper describes tools that let HOL users, even unsophisticated ones, employ sophisticated HOL concepts in conveniently specifying system designs and proving that these designs have particular nondisclosure security properties. These tools include the Romulus Interface Process Specification Language (IPSL) and a translator for translating IPSL specifications into HOL90.

Supported by Rome Laboratory Contract F30602-90-C-0092

The author wishes to thank Shiu-Kai Chin, David Rosenthal, Randy Calistri-Yeh, Doug Long, and the referees for helpful comments.

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Thomas F. Melham Juanito Camilleri

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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Brackin, S.H. (1994). Providing tractable security analyses in HOL. In: Melham, T.F., Camilleri, J. (eds) Higher Order Logic Theorem Proving and Its Applications. HUG 1994. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 859. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58450-1_35

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58450-1_35

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-58450-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-48803-3

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