Abstract
The formal statement of the Modal Truth Criterion presented by Chapman [1] is shown not to be necessary, in contradiction of Chapman's original claim that the criterion is both necessary and sufficient. This is achieved through the presentation of a counter-example which is a partial plan in which a goal is necessarily true, and yet fails to satisfy Chapman's criterion. A corollary of this result is that the validity checking problem for partial plans, claimed by Chapman to be polynomially solvable, is now open.
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References
Chapman, D.: Planning for conjunctive goals. Artificial Intelligence 29 (1987) 333–377
Fox, M., Long, D.: A re-examination of the modal truth criterion for non-linear planners. Research Note, University College London, (1992).
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© 1993 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Fox, M., Long, D. (1993). A note on Chapman's Modal Truth Criterion. In: Filgueiras, M., Damas, L. (eds) Progress in Artificial Intelligence. EPIA 1993. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 727. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-57287-2_56
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-57287-2_56
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