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Security Aspects of the Ecash™ Payment System

  • Berry Schoenmakers
Chapter
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1528)

Abstract

Ecash is a payment system designed and implemented for making purchases over open networks such as the Internet. In this paper we review the main cryptographic techniques used throughout the ecash system. We will focus on security aspects as well as some performance related issues. The central notion of an electronic coin is treated in detail, and the basic protocols manipulating coins are described.

Keywords

Smart Card Payment System Blind Signature Security Aspect Payment Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Berry Schoenmakers
    • 1
  1. 1.DigiCashVA AmsterdamThe Netherlands

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