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On Solutions to the Key Escrow Problem

  • Mark P. Hoyle
  • Chris J. Mitchell
Chapter
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1528)

Abstract

The first part of this paper is devoted to explaining what key escrow is and why it exists, and attempts to put it into a historical context. The subsequent focus is primarily on key escrow schemes which will work in an international environment. The possibility of using conventional key distribution techniques to provide key escrow services in an international context is first considered, and the associated problems are explored. The “Royal Holloway” (RH) key escrow scheme is then described in a way which is intended to clarify and motivate its design, and the properties of this scheme and some related schemes are considered.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark P. Hoyle
    • 1
  • Chris J. Mitchell
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security GroupUniversity of LondonEgham

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