Abstract
The Neuman-Stubblebine key exchange protocol is formalized in first-order logic and analyzed by the automated theorem prover Spass. In addition to the analysis, we develop the necessary theoretical background providing new (un)decidability results for monadic firstorder fragments involved in the analysis. The approach is applicable to a variety of security protocols and we identify possible extensions leading to future directions of research.
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Weidenbach, C. (1999). Towards an Automatic Analysis of Security Protocols in First-Order Logic. In: Automated Deduction — CADE-16. CADE 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1632. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48660-7_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48660-7_29
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